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This appeal involves a patented drug called AndroGel. 
A blockbuster testosterone replacement therapy that generated 
billions of dollars in sales, AndroGel caught the attention of 
the Federal Trade Commission. The FTC sued the owners of 
an AndroGel patent—AbbVie, Inc., Abbott Laboratories, 
Unimed Pharmaceuticals LLC, and Besins Healthcare, Inc.—
under Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. The FTC alleged that Defendants filed sham 
patent infringement suits against Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, 
Inc. and Perrigo Company, and that AbbVie, Abbott, and 
Unimed entered into an anticompetitive reverse-payment 
agreement with Teva. The FTC accused Defendants of trying 
to monopolize and restrain trade over AndroGel. 
The District Court dismissed the FTC’s claims to the 
extent they relied on a reverse-payment theory but found 
Defendants liable for monopolization on the sham-litigation 
theory. The Court ordered Defendants to disgorge $448 million 
in ill-gotten profits but denied the FTC’s request for an 
injunction. The parties cross-appeal.  
 We hold the District Court erred by rejecting the 
reverse-payment theory and in concluding Defendants’ 
litigation against Teva was a sham. The Court did not err, 
however, in concluding the Perrigo litigation was a sham and 
that Defendants had monopoly power in the relevant market. 
Yet the FTC has not shown the monopolization entitles it to 
any remedy. The Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
injunctive relief; and the Court erred by ordering disgorgement 
because that remedy is unavailable under Section 13(b) of the 
FTC Act. Accordingly, we will reinstate the FTC’s dismissed 
claims and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. We will also affirm in part and reverse in part the 
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Court’s order adjudging Defendants liable for monopolization. 
Finally, we will affirm the Court’s order denying injunctive 
relief and reverse the Court’s order requiring Defendants to 
disgorge $448 million. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. FDA Approval under the Hatch-Waxman Act 
 The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the FDC Act), 21 
U.S.C. § 301 et seq., empowers the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) to regulate the manufacture and sale of 
drugs in the United States. Before a pharmaceutical company 
can market a drug, it must obtain FDA approval. Id. § 355(a). 
Under the FDC Act, as amended by the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (the 
Hatch-Waxman Act), 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C. § 271, a 
company can apply for FDA approval in one of three ways: 
1. Section 505(b)(1) New Drug Application (NDA). This is 
a “full-length” application. FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 329 F. 
Supp. 3d 98, 107 (E.D. Pa. 2018). The “gauntlet of 
procedures” associated with it is “long, comprehensive, 
and costly.” In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig. Indirect 
Purchaser Class, 868 F.3d 132, 143 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(citation omitted). It includes “full reports of 
investigations” into whether the drug is safe and 
effective, a “full list of . . . [the drug’s] components,” a 
“full description of the methods used in . . . the 
manufacture, processing, and packing” of the drug, 
samples of the drug, and specimens of the labeling the 
company proposes to use. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). A 
company must also list any relevant patents. See 
Wellbutrin, 868 F.3d at 144 (citation omitted). We refer 
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to drugs approved through this process as “brand-name” 
drugs. 
2. Section 505(j) Abbreviated New Drug Application 
(ANDA). This streamlined application is appropriate for 
a company seeking to market a generic version of a 
brand-name drug. The company need not produce its 
own safety and efficacy data. 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(2)(A)(vi). But it must show that the generic drug 
is “the same” as the brand-name drug in certain relevant 
respects. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A). It also must “assure the 
FDA that its proposed generic drug will not infringe the 
brand’s patents.” Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo 
Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 406 (2012). It can do so by 
certifying that the manufacture, use, or sale of the 
generic will not infringe patents relating to the brand-
name drug, or that those patents are invalid. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). This certification is known as 
a “paragraph IV notice.” AbbVie, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 
108.  
 The first company to seek FDA approval in this 
way enjoys “a period of 180 days of exclusivity,” during 
which “no other generic can compete with the brand-
name drug.” FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 143–44 
(2013) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iv)). “[T]his 
180-day period . . . can prove valuable, possibly worth 
several hundred million dollars.” Id. at 144 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). One exception is 
that during the 180-day exclusivity period, the brand-
name company can produce a generic version of its own 
drug or license a third party to do so. See Mylan Pharm., 
Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 276–77 (4th Cir. 2006). 
These “authorized generics” can decrease the value an 
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applicant receives from the 180-day exclusivity period 
to the extent they share the generic drug market and 
depress prices. See id. at 273. 
3. Section 505(b)(2) New Drug Application (hybrid NDA). 
This application is appropriate for a company seeking 
to modify another company’s brand-name drug. For 
example, a company might seek FDA approval of “a 
new indication or new dosage form.” 21 C.F.R. § 
314.54(a). This application is like an ANDA because 
the company need not produce all safety and efficacy 
data about the drug and because it must assure the FDA 
that its generic drug will not infringe the brand’s 
patents. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv). But it differs 
from an ANDA because the company must produce 
some data, including whatever “information [is] needed 
to support the modification(s).” 21 C.F.R. § 314.54(a). 
 The latter two pathways “speed the introduction of low-
cost generic drugs to market” and promote competition in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 142 (internal 
citation omitted). 
B. Patent disputes under the Hatch-Waxman Act 
 The Hatch-Waxman Act also has provisions that 
encourage the quick resolution of patent disputes. See 
Wellbutrin, 868 F.3d at 144. A paragraph IV notice 
“automatically counts as patent infringement.” Id. (quoting 
Actavis, 570 U.S. at 143 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A))). 
After receiving this notice, a patentee has 45 days to decide 
whether to sue. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
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 To help a patentee make that decision, the company 
seeking approval of a generic drug often allows the patentee’s 
outside counsel to review the company’s application in secret. 
If the patentee sues within the time limit, the FDA cannot 
approve the company’s application for a generic drug until one 
of three things happens: (1) a court holds that the patent is 
invalid or has not been infringed; (2) the patent expires; or (3) 
30 months elapse, as measured from the date the patentee 
received the paragraph IV notice. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 The automatic, 30-month stay creates tension with the 
Hatch-Waxman Act’s procompetitive goals. Simply by suing, 
a patentee can delay the introduction of low-cost generic drugs 
to market and impede competition in the pharmaceutical 
industry. Cf. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 142. 
C. Therapeutic equivalence ratings 
 After the FDA approves a company’s generic drug, the 
company can seek a therapeutic equivalence (TE) rating. 
“Products that are determined to be therapeutically equivalent 
[to the brand] are assigned an ‘A’ or ‘AB’ rating. Generic 
products for which therapeutic equivalence cannot be 
determined are assigned a ‘B’ or ‘BX’ rating.” AbbVie, 329 F. 
Supp. 3d at 107. Generic drug companies usually prefer A or 
AB ratings because every state’s law “either permit[s] or 
require[s] pharmacists to dispense a therapeutically equivalent, 
lower-cost generic drug in place of a brand drug.” Mylan 
Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., 838 F.3d 421, 428 
(3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
13 
 
D. Hypogonadism and testosterone replacement 
therapies 
 Hypogonadism is a clinical syndrome resulting from 
low testosterone in the human body. See AbbVie, 329 F. Supp. 
3d at 108. It affects an estimated 2-6 percent of the adult male 
population in the United States and causes “decreases in energy 
and libido, erectile dysfunction, and changes in body 
composition.” Id.  
 Doctors treat hypogonadism with testosterone 
replacement therapies (TRTs). TRTs include injectables, 
topical/transdermals (TTRTs), and other therapies. Companies 
first marketed injectables in the 1950s. Because generic 
injectables have been available for decades, they are the least 
expensive. They involve dissolving testosterone in a liquid and 
injecting it into the patient’s body every one to three weeks. 
Some patients administer injections to themselves at home, 
while others receive injections at their doctor’s office or a 
specialized testosterone clinic. By contrast, TTRTs first 
appeared in the 1990s and are more expensive. They deliver 
testosterone to the patient’s body through a patch or gel applied 
to the patient’s skin. Gels are applied daily.  
 TRTs have different benefits and drawbacks. Some 
patients dislike injectables because the injection is painful, or 
because the “peak in testosterone level” after the injection 
causes “swings in mood, libido, and energy.” Id. at 109. Many 
of these patients prefer TTRTs because they release 
testosterone steadily. Other patients dislike TTRT gels. 
Common complaints include skin irritation and the 
inconvenience of having to apply the gel daily. And patients 
sometimes transfer the testosterone gel to others inadvertently 
through skin-to-skin contact. Finally, some patients dislike 
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TTRT patches, which can irritate the skin and are visible to 
other people, depending on where the patch is applied.  
E. AndroGel 
 In the 1990s, Laboratoires Besins International S.A.S. 
(LBI)—a corporate affiliate of Besins’s parent company—
developed the TTRT gel that became AndroGel. In 1995, LBI 
licensed to Unimed certain intellectual property relating to the 
gel, and Unimed assumed responsibility for marketing the gel 
in the United States. In exchange, Unimed agreed to pay LBI a 
royalty on the gel’s net sales. Unimed secured FDA approval 
for the gel in 2000. That same year, Unimed and Besins filed a 
joint U.S. patent application, and, in 2003, U.S. Patent No. 
6,503,894 (the ’894 patent) issued.  
 Today, Besins and AbbVie co-own the ’894 patent. 
AbbVie acquired Unimed’s interest in the patent as follows: in 
1999, Unimed was acquired by Solvay; in 2010, Solvay was 
acquired by Abbott; in 2013, Abbott separated into two 
companies—Abbott and AbbVie—with AbbVie assuming all 
of Abbott’s propriety pharmaceutical business, including its 
interest in AndroGel.  
 Solvay brought AndroGel to market in 2000. At the 
time, AndroGel was available only in a sachet form at 1% 
strength. From 2004-2013, Solvay and its successors marketed 
AndroGel in a metered-dose pump form. And in 2011, Abbott 
started marketing AndroGel at 1.62% strength. Sales of 
AndroGel 1.62% grew more slowly than anticipated, but by 
June 2012, they comprised most of AndroGel’s total sales.  
 AndroGel has been a huge commercial success. Its 
annual net sales sometimes surpassed a billion dollars and 
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remained strong even after generic versions of AndroGel 
entered the market in 2015. From 2009-2015, it generated a 
high profit margin of about 65 percent. 
F. The ’894 patent’s prosecution history 
 TTRT gels use “penetration enhancers” to accelerate the 
delivery of testosterone through a patient’s skin. AndroGel’s 
penetration enhancer is isopropyl myristate.  
 Unimed and Besins’s joint patent application was U.S. 
Patent Application Serial No. 09/651,777. As originally 
drafted, claim 1 of the patent application claimed all 
penetration enhancers: 
A pharmaceutical composition useful for the 
percutaneous delivery of an active 
pharmaceutical ingredient, comprising: 
(a) a C1-C4 alcohol; 
(b) a penetration enhancer; 
(c) the active pharmaceutical ingredient; and 
(d) water. 
App. 909 (emphasis added). The penetration enhancers then in 
existence numbered in the tens of millions. 
 In June 2001, the patent examiner rejected this claim as 
obvious over two prior art references—Mak in view of Allen. 
Mak disclosed the penetration enhancer oleic acid used in a 
transdermal testosterone gel. Allen disclosed isopropyl 
myristate, isopropyl palmitate, and three other penetration 
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enhancers used in a nitroglycerin cream. The examiner 
explained that “since all composition components herein are 
known to be useful for the percutaneous delivery of 
pharmaceuticals, it is considered prima facie obvious to 
combine them into a single composition useful for the very 
same purpose.” App. 1014–16. 
 In October 2001, Unimed and Besins amended the 
patent application’s claim 1 to recite at least one of 24 
penetration enhancers, including isopropyl myristate and 
isostearic acid. Isopropyl palmitate was not among the 24. 
Unimed and Besins also added several new claims. Claim 47 
recited “a penetration enhancer selected from the group 
consisting of isopropyl myristate and lauryl alcohol.” App. 
1022. And claims 61 and 62 recited only isopropyl myristate as 
a penetration enhancer.  
 Unimed and Besins sought “reconsideration and 
withdrawal of the [obviousness] rejections and allowance of 
the[se] claims.” App. 1039. In support, they cited AndroGel’s 
commercial success. See id.; see generally Graham v. John 
Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (holding 
commercial success is a “secondary consideration” suggesting 
nonobviousness). They also argued “[t]he mere fact that 
references can be combined or modified does not render the 
resultant combination obvious unless the prior art also suggests 
the desirability of the combination.” App. 1030–31 (citations 
omitted). For three reasons, they said, the prior art did not 
suggest combining Mak and Allen. First, Mak “[taught] away 
from using the presently claimed penetration enhancers by 
focusing on the superiority of oleic acid.” App. 1032. Second, 
the claimed penetration enhancers had an “unexpected and 
unique pharmacokinetic and phamacodynamic profile.” Id. 
And third, “the prior art recognize[d] the chemical and 
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physiologic/functional differences of penetration enhancers, 
including the differences between oleic acid and the claimed 
enhancers, such as isopropyl myristate.” App. 1037–38. 
 Attorneys for Unimed and Besins then met with the 
examiner for an interview. The examiner opined that “claims 
61-62 are . . . allowable over the prior art.” App. 1084. She also 
noted that the attorneys “argued claim 47 is novel [and] 
nonobvious over the prior art because the prior art does not 
teach the composition with particular concentrations [of 
isopropyl myristate and lauryl alcohol].” Id. 
 In December 2001 and February 2002, Unimed and 
Besins twice more amended the patent application. They 
cancelled claims 1 and 62, amended claim 47 to cover only a 
composition comprising isopropyl myristate, and modified the 
concentration ranges for isopropyl myristate in claim 61. With 
each amendment, they sought “reconsideration and withdrawal 
of the [obviousness] rejections and allowance of the[se] 
claims.” App. 1095, 1129. 
 The examiner issued a notice of allowability. She wrote 
that “[t]he claimed pharmaceutical composition consisting 
essentially of the particular ingredients herein in the specific 
amounts, is not seen to be taught or fairly suggested by the 
prior art.” App. 1152. She clarified that she considered the 
amendments “all together,” and they sufficed to “remove the 
prior art rejection . . . over [Mak in view of Allen].” Id.  
 In January 2003, the ’894 patent issued. It expired on 
August 30, 2020. 
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G. AndroGel’s competitors 
 When Solvay brought AndroGel to market in 2000, its 
only competitors were injectables and two TTRT patches (i.e., 
Testoderm and Androderm). Since then, companies have 
marketed four other TTRT gels (i.e., Testim, Axiron, Fortesta, 
and Vogelxo). Companies have also developed other TRTs, 
including Striant (a buccal tablet applied twice daily to a 
patient’s gums), Testopel (a pellet surgically inserted into a 
patient’s body every three to six months), and Natesto (a nasal 
spray administered three times a day). 
H. The lawsuits against Teva and Perrigo 
 In December 2008, Perrigo filed two ANDAs for a 
generic 1% testosterone gel in sachet and pump forms, and in 
June 2009 it served paragraph IV notices on Unimed and 
Besins. It asserted that because its gel used the penetration 
enhancer isostearic acid instead of isopropyl myristate, the gel 
would not literally infringe the ’894 patent. It also argued the 
gel would not infringe the patent under the doctrine of 
equivalents, which provides that “[t]he scope of a 
patent . . . embraces all equivalents to the claims described.” 
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (“Festo 
VIII”), 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002). Perrigo explained the ’894 
patent’s prosecution history would estop Unimed and Besins 
from claiming equivalency between isostearic acid and 
isopropyl myristate, because they originally claimed isostearic 
acid before excluding it in response to a rejection. This 
limitation on the doctrine of equivalents is known as 
prosecution history estoppel. Id. at 733–34. 
 Solvay, Unimed, and Besins retained outside counsel to 
review Perrigo’s ANDAs. In July 2009, Solvay and Unimed 
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issued a press release stating that they had carefully evaluated 
the ANDAs and decided not to sue Perrigo, in part because 
Perrigo’s gel “contains a different formulation than the 
formulation protected by the AndroGel patent.” AbbVie, 329 F. 
Supp. 3d at 111. Besins also decided not to sue.  
 That same year, the FDA learned that patients were 
accidentally transferring TTRT gels to children through skin-
to-skin contact. AndroGel’s new owner Abbott petitioned the 
FDA to require Perrigo to resubmit its 2009 ANDAs as hybrid 
NDAs. See 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (FDA citizen petition form). That 
would require Perrigo to investigate whether isostearic acid 
poses a higher risk of accidental transfer than isopropyl 
myristate. Abbott also asked the FDA to require Perrigo to 
serve new paragraph IV notices on Abbott and Besins, thereby 
reopening the 45-day window for them to decide whether to 
sue. The FDA granted Abbott’s petition in relevant part. 
 In January 2011, Teva filed a hybrid NDA for a generic 
1% testosterone gel in sachet and pump forms, and in March 
2011 it served paragraph IV notices on Abbott, Solvay, 
Unimed, and Besins. Teva asserted its gel would not literally 
infringe the ’894 patent because it used isopropyl palmitate 
instead of isopropyl myristate. It also explained that the ’894 
patent’s prosecution history would estop Abbott and Besins 
from claiming infringement on the ground that isopropyl 
palmitate is equivalent to isopropyl myristate. Abbott and 
Besins retained outside counsel to review Teva’s hybrid NDA. 
 On April 29, 2011, Abbott, Unimed, and Besins sued 
Teva for patent infringement in the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware. They argued that isopropyl 
myristate and isopropyl palmitate were equivalent. The lawsuit 
triggered the Hatch-Waxman Act’s automatic, 30-month stay 
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on FDA approval for Teva’s gel. Teva responded that 
prosecution history estoppel applied because Unimed and 
Besins’s October 2001 amendment—which narrowed the 
application’s claim 1 from all penetration enhancers to a list of 
24—surrendered isopropyl palmitate. Abbott, Unimed, and 
Besins disagreed. They cited an exception to prosecution 
history estoppel—known as “tangentiality”—that applies if 
“the rationale underlying the amendment [bore] no more than 
a tangential relation to the equivalent in question.” Festo VIII, 
535 U.S. at 740. Abbott, Unimed, and Besins argued the 
October 2001 amendment sought to overcome Mak’s use of 
oleic acid and was thus tangential to isopropyl palmitate, which 
Allen disclosed. The Court set trial for May 2012.  
 In July 2011, Perrigo filed a hybrid NDA for generic 1% 
testosterone gel, and in September 2001, it served new 
paragraph IV notices on Abbott, Unimed, and Besins. It again 
asserted its gel would not infringe the ’894 patent. And it added 
that “a lawsuit asserting the ’894 patent against Perrigo would 
be objectively baseless and a sham, brought in bad faith for the 
improper purpose of, inter alia, delaying Perrigo’s NDA 
approval.” AbbVie, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 114. A bad faith motive 
for suing would be “particularly apparent,” Perrigo said, in 
light of Solvay’s July 2009 press release. Id. Abbott, Unimed, 
and Besins retained outside counsel to review Perrigo’s hybrid 
NDA.  
 In August 2011, Abbott petitioned the FDA not to grant 
therapeutic equivalence ratings to hybrid NDAs referencing 
AndroGel. Alternatively, it asked the FDA to assign such 
products BX ratings. 
 On October 31, 2011, Abbott, Unimed, and Besins sued 
Perrigo in the United States District Court for the District of 
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New Jersey. That lawsuit triggered the Hatch-Waxman Act’s 
automatic, 30-month stay on FDA approval for Perrigo’s gel. 
 Four in-house patent attorneys in AbbVie’s intellectual 
property group and AbbVie’s general counsel decided to sue 
Teva and Perrigo. Those attorneys had “extensive experience 
in patent law and with AbbVie.” See id. at 113. However, “[n]o 
business persons at AbbVie were involved in the decision to 
sue.” Id. As for Besins, its in-house counsel Thomas 
MacAllister decided to sue. MacAllister is an experienced 
intellectual property attorney and a former patent examiner.  
I. The settlements with Perrigo and Teva 
 In December 2011, Abbott and Perrigo settled. They 
agreed to dismiss all claims and counterclaims with prejudice; 
Abbott agreed to pay Perrigo $2 million as reasonable litigation 
expenses; and Abbott agreed to license Perrigo to market its 
generic 1% testosterone gel on either January 1, 2015 or when 
another generic version came to market, whichever was sooner. 
(The last provision is known as an acceleration clause). Perrigo 
unsuccessfully pushed for an earlier market entry date in 
settlement negotiations. Its assistant general counsel Andrew 
Solomon later said he predicted the acceleration clause would 
provide Perrigo with an earlier entry date, because he saw “a 
very good probability Teva could prevail” against Abbott and 
Besins at trial in the other lawsuit. AbbVie, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 
115. He also said he advised Perrigo that it had a 75 percent 
chance of success, had the litigation proceeded to trial. He 
explained this figure meant Perrigo felt “very, very strongly 
about [its] chances for success, recognizing that there is [an] 
inherent uncertainty . . . any time a case gets in front of an 
arbiter.” App. 4071. 
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 Abbott and Teva also settled in December 2011, soon 
after the court set a trial date. Abbott agreed to license Teva to 
market its generic 1% testosterone gel on December 27, 
2014—almost six years before the ’894 patent expired. Teva 
pushed unsuccessfully for an earlier market–entry date in 
settlement negotiations.  
 On the same day Abbott and Teva settled the 
infringement suit, they also made a deal involving a popular 
brand-name cholesterol drug named TriCor. A previous 
settlement between Abbott and Teva had set Teva’s entry in the 
TriCor market for July 2012. And because Teva was the first 
generic challenger to TriCor, Teva was entitled to 180 days of 
marketing exclusivity. Teva was struggling to capitalize on the 
exclusivity period, though, because it could not secure FDA 
approval. In the December 2011 deal, Abbott agreed to grant 
Teva a license to sell a generic version of TriCor, which Abbott 
would supply to Teva at Teva’s option, for a four-year term 
beginning in November 2012. This supply agreement provided 
for Teva to pay Abbott the costs of production, an additional 
percentage of that cost, and a royalty.  
 According to the FTC, the December 2011 settlement 
agreement and TriCor deal were an illegal reverse payment. A 
reverse payment occurs when a patentee, as plaintiff, pays an 
alleged infringer, as defendant, to end a lawsuit. See 
Wellbutrin, 868 F.3d at 142 n.3 (citing Actavis, 570 U.S. at 
140–41). Such agreements can be anticompetitive if they allow 
a brand-name company to split its monopoly profits with a 
generic company in exchange for the generic agreeing to delay 
market entry. As applied here, the FTC alleges Abbott 
calculated that it would sacrifice about $100 million in TriCor 
sales, but that was a small fraction of the billions of dollars in 
AndroGel revenue it protected by deferring competition in the 
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TTRT market for three years. Deferring competition also gave 
Abbott time to shift sales to Androgel 1.62%, for which there 
were no generic competitors. As for Teva, it “concluded that it 
would be better off by sharing in AbbVie[’s] monopoly profits 
from the sale of AndroGel than by competing.” App. 4418. 
 Teva’s settlement triggered the acceleration clause in 
Perrigo’s settlement agreement, so Perrigo’s licensed entry 
date became December 27, 2014. 
J. Teva and Perrigo’s generic versions of AndroGel 
 In February 2012, the FDA approved Teva’s hybrid 
NDA for the sachet form of its generic 1% testosterone gel. 
Teva withdrew the pump form from its application after the 
FDA identified a safety concern with the packaging. But the 
FDA allowed Teva to resubmit the pump form as a post-
approval amendment.  
 In January 2013, the FDA approved Perrigo’s hybrid 
NDA for generic 1% testosterone gel. It then considered the 
gel’s therapeutic equivalence rating. Perrigo sent the FDA three 
letters to expedite the FDA’s consideration. AbbVie petitioned 
the FDA to issue Perrigo’s product a BX rating.  
 In March 2014, Perrigo sued the FDA, accusing it of 
unreasonable delay. The FDA responded that “Perrigo has 
itself obviated the need for a prompt decision by reaching an 
agreement with [Abbott] not to market until December 2014.” 
AbbVie, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 116. It said it expected to rate 
Perrigo’s gel “by July 31, 2014—some five months before 
Perrigo’s planned product launch.” Id. On July 23, 2014, the 
FDA issued the gel an AB rating, and Perrigo dismissed its 
lawsuit against the FDA. See id. at 116, 116 n.9. Perrigo 
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brought its gel to market on December 27, 2014, its licensed 
entry date. 
 Also on July 23, 2014, the FDA issued Teva’s gel a BX 
rating. Teva never marketed the product.  
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 The FTC sued AbbVie, Abbott, Unimed, Besins, and 
Teva under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 15 
U.S.C. § 53(b). We refer to AbbVie, Abbott, Unimed, and 
Solvay as “AbbVie” for simplicity.  
In Count I of the complaint, the FTC alleged AbbVie 
and Besins willfully maintained a monopoly through a course 
of anticompetitive conduct, including sham patent litigation 
against Teva and Perrigo. In Count II, the FTC alleged AbbVie 
restrained trade by entering into an anticompetitive reverse-
payment agreement with Teva. The FTC requested that the 
Court enjoin AbbVie and Besins “from engaging in similar and 
related conduct in the future,” and that the Court “grant such 
other equitable [monetary] relief as [it] finds necessary, 
including restitution or disgorgement.” App. 4454. 
 AbbVie and Besins moved to dismiss “Count I to the 
extent it [wa]s premised on the” alleged reverse payments, 
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dkt. 2:14-cv-05151, ECF No. 38 at 1. AbbVie also moved to 
dismiss Count II in its entirety, as it was based only on the 




 The FTC moved for reconsideration after our decision 
in King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 791 F.3d 388 (3d Cir. 2015). But the District Court 
distinguished King Drug and denied the motion.  
 The FTC then moved for partial summary judgment on 
the sham-litigation theory supporting Count I. AbbVie and 
Besins sought summary judgment as well.  
 The sham-litigation theory required the FTC to prove 
(1) that AbbVie had monopoly power in the relevant market 
and (2) that AbbVie willfully acquired or maintained that 
power through sham litigation. See Mylan, 838 F.3d at 433. 
Sham litigation has two prongs. “First, the lawsuit must be 
objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant 
could realistically expect success on the merits.” Prof’l Real 
Estate Invs., Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. (“PRE”), 
508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993). And second, the lawsuit must conceal 
an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships 
of a competitor through the use of the governmental process as 
an anticompetitive weapon. See id. at 60–61. The FTC sought 
summary judgment only on the objective baselessness prong.  
 The District Court granted the FTC partial summary 
judgment and denied AbbVie and Besins’s motions. The Court 
held a sixteen-day bench trial on sham litigation’s subjective 
prong and monopoly power, and it found for the FTC on both. 
See AbbVie, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 146. The Court awarded 
“equitable monetary relief in favor of the FTC and against 
[AbbVie and Besins] in the amount of $448 million, which 
represent[ed] disgorgement of [their] ill-gotten profits.” Id. It 
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declined to enter an injunction. The FTC, AbbVie, and Besins 
now appeal.  
 The FTC argues the District Court erred in dismissing 
its claims to the extent they relied on a reverse-payment theory; 
abused its discretion in calculating the amount of 
disgorgement; and abused its discretion in denying the FTC 
injunctive relief.  
 AbbVie and Besins argue the District Court erred in 
concluding the infringement suits against Teva and Perrigo met 
either prong of the sham-litigation standard, and that AbbVie 
had monopoly power in the relevant market. They also argue 
the Court erred in ordering disgorgement because Section 
13(b) of the FTC Act does not authorize disgorgement, the 
disgorgement is a penalty rather than an equitable remedy, and 
the FTC failed to prove statutory preconditions for injunctive 
relief. Finally, they argue the Court abused its discretion in 
calculating the amount of disgorgement  
III. JURISDICTION 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. The parties to this appeal agree that we have 
jurisdiction. Yet we have a “continuing obligation to . . . raise 
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction if it is in question.” 
Bracken v. Matgouranis, 296 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(citations omitted). 
 Our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 extends to 
“appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the 
United States.” But there is an exception. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has “exclusive 
jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final decision of a district 
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court of the United States . . . in any civil action arising 
under . . . any Act of Congress relating to patents.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1295(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 A civil action “aris[es] under” federal patent law if “a 
well-pleaded complaint” shows either that “federal patent law 
creates the cause of action,” or “the plaintiff’s right to relief 
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of 
federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of 
one of the well-pleaded claims.” Christianson v. Colt Indus. 
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988) (emphasis added). 
In this appeal, the former basis for the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisdiction does not apply because “[f]ederal . . . antitrust law, 
not federal patent law, creates [the FTC’s] claims.” In re Lipitor 
Antitrust Litig., 855 F.3d 126, 145 (3d Cir. 2017) (emphasis 
omitted). So “[t]his case . . . turns on the [latter basis]” for the 
Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction. Id. 
 The latter basis applies only if two requirements are 
met. First, federal patent law must be a “necessary” element of 
one of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded claims. Here, the word 
“necessary” takes its strict, logical meaning: “a claim 
supported by alternative theories in the complaint may not 
form the basis for [the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction] 
unless patent law is essential to each of those theories.” 
Christianson, 486 U.S. at 810 (emphasis added). And the 
patent-law issues must be “substantial.” Id. at 809. 
 The Supreme Court has yet to interpret the 
substantiality requirement in a case involving 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1295(a)(1) in its current form. But it has addressed the 
requirement in cases involving 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), which is 
analogous because it gives district courts exclusive jurisdiction 
over “any civil action arising under any Act of Congress 
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relating to patents.” (emphasis added). In Gunn v. Minton, 568 
U.S. 251 (2013), the Court held a state legal malpractice claim 
arising out of a patent infringement proceeding did not present 
a “substantial” federal issue vesting federal district courts with 
exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 261. The Court first clarified that 
whether a question is “substantial” turns not on the 
“importance of the issue to the plaintiff’s case and to the 
parties,” but instead on “the importance of the issue to the 
federal system as a whole.” Id. at 260. Applying that standard, 
it emphasized that because the legal malpractice claim was 
“backward-looking” and the issue it raised was “hypothetical,” 
the state court could not change the patent’s invalidity as 
determined by the prior federal patent litigation. Id. at 261. Nor 
could the state court undermine the uniformity of federal patent 
law going forward, because federal courts “are of course not 
bound by state court . . . patent rulings” and “state courts can 
be expected to hew closely to the pertinent federal precedents.” 
Id. at 261–62 (citations omitted). Moreover, any preclusive 
effect the state court’s ruling might have “would be limited to 
the parties and patents that had been before the state court.” Id. 
at 263. Finally, the mere possibility that the state court might 
misunderstand patent law and incorrectly resolve a state claim 
was not “enough to trigger the federal courts’ exclusive patent 
jurisdiction.” Id. 
 This appeal meets neither of the requirements for the 
latter basis of the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, 
the Federal Circuit does not have exclusive jurisdiction here. 
First, federal patent law is not a “necessary” element of one of 
the FTC’s well-pleaded claims. In its complaint, the FTC 
“challenges a course of anticompetitive conduct,” which the 
complaint defines to include AbbVie and Besins’s “sham 
patent infringement litigation” and “[AbbVie’s] . . . illegal 
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[reverse-payment] agreement.” App. 4416. The complaint then 
asserts two counts. Count II (Restraint of Trade) claims AbbVie 
violated federal antitrust law by entering into an 
anticompetitive reverse-payment agreement with Teva. App. 
4453–54. We have held that “reverse-payment antitrust claims 
do not present a question of patent law.” Lipitor, 855 F.3d at 
146 (citing Actavis, 570 U.S. at 158 (“[T]he size of the 
unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate 
for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct 
a detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.”) 
(citation omitted)). Thus, patent law is not a necessary element 
of Count II. 
 The same reasoning applies to Count I 
(Monopolization). It first “reallege[s] and incorporate[s] by 
reference” all of the complaint’s allegations. App. 4453. It then 
asserts that AbbVie and Besins willfully maintained a 
monopoly “through a course of anticompetitive conduct, 
including filing sham patent litigation against Teva and 
Perrigo.” Id. By its terms, Count I challenges a “course of 
anticompetitive conduct,” which the complaint earlier defines 
to include not only sham litigation, but also the reverse-
payment agreement. Because reverse-payment theories do not 
present a question of patent law, patent law is not a necessary 
element of Count I either. 
 Our reasoning is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Christianson and our decision in Lipitor. In both 
cases, the presence of “non-patent-law theories of liability 
supporting the . . . plaintiffs’ monopolization claims vest[ed] 
jurisdiction over their appeals” in the regional circuit, “not the 
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Federal Circuit.” Lipitor, 855 F.3d at 146 (citing Christianson, 
486 U.S. at 812). 
 The parties’ conduct before the District Court also 
supports our interpretation. AbbVie and Besins moved to 
dismiss “Count I to the extent it [wa]s premised on the” alleged 
reverse payments. Dkt. 2:14-cv-05151, ECF No. 38 at 1. The 
District Court granted that motion. Because Count I is 
premised, at least in part, on this non-patent-law theory, the 
Federal Circuit does not have exclusive jurisdiction over this 
action. 
 It is true that the FTC pleads in Count I that the course 
of conduct “includ[es]” sham patent litigation. App. 4453. And 
a sham-litigation theory does present patent-law questions 
because it requires us to review the objective reasonableness of 
AbbVie and Besins’s patent-infringement litigation against 
Teva and Perrigo. See PRE, 508 U.S. at 60. But that fact does 
not undermine our jurisdiction because the sham-litigation 
theory is one of two theories supporting Count I. And the other 
theory—the reverse-payment theory—does not present a 
question of patent law. See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 810. 
 We also note that the FTC has not contended that Besins 
and Teva entered into an independent reverse-payment 
agreement. Thus, it might be argued the FTC’s right to relief as 
against Besins necessarily depends on resolution of patent-law 
questions.1 We disagree because the FTC’s complaint may be 
read to allege that Besins participated in AbbVie’s settlement 
with Teva. The complaint notes “[t]he sham lawsuits did not 
 
1 Judge Phipps would have accepted this argument and 
held we have jurisdiction because the patent-law issues the 
FTC’s sham-litigation theory presents are not substantial. 
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eliminate the threat of Teva’s and Perrigo’s products to AbbVie 
Defendants and Besins’s monopoly.” App. 4441. It then asserts 
“AbbVie . . . and Besins . . . turned to other ways to preserve 
their monopoly,” including AbbVie’s settlement with Teva. 
App. 4442. As mentioned above, the parties’ conduct before 
the District Court supports our reading because both AbbVie 
and Besins moved to dismiss “Count I to the extent it [wa]s 
premised on the” alleged reverse payments. 
 Thus, patent law is not a “necessary” element of one of 
the FTC’s well-pleaded claims, so the latter basis for the 
Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction does not apply. 
 Second, the patent-law issues that the FTC’s sham-
litigation theory presents are not “substantial,” in the sense that 
they are important to the “federal system as a whole.” Gunn, 
568 U.S. at 260. So even if federal patent law were a 
“necessary” element of one of the FTC’s well-pleaded claims, 
the latter basis for the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction 
still would not apply. Like the state legal malpractice claim in 
Gunn, the sham-litigation theory here is purely backward 
looking: just as the state court’s adjudication of the legal 
malpractice claim could not change the result of the prior 
federal patent litigation, our adjudication of the FTC’s sham-
litigation theory cannot change the settlement that resulted 
from AbbVie and Besins’s infringement suits against Teva and 
Perrigo. See id. at 261.2 
 Nor would adjudicating the sham-litigation theory 
undermine the uniformity of federal patent law. See id. at 261–
 
2 It might be argued the patent-law issues Gunn 
presented are less substantial than the ones we face here 
because the patent litigation in Gunn led to the patent’s 
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62. The reasons for this are general and case specific. 
Generally, much like the state court’s decision in Gunn could 
not bind federal courts, the parts of our decision in this appeal 
that interpret patent law cannot bind the Federal Circuit or 
district courts outside the Third Circuit. See id. And like the 
state court in Gunn, we must hew closely to the Federal 
Circuit’s precedents. See id. If the patent-law issues we decide 
arise frequently, they “will soon be resolved within [the Federal 
Circuit], laying to rest any contrary . . . precedent.” Id. at 262. 
Otherwise, they are “unlikely to implicate substantial federal 
interests.” Id. 
 There are two additional, case-specific reasons that 
adjudicating the sham-litigation theory would not undermine 
the uniformity of federal patent law. First, litigation is a sham 
only if it is objectively baseless, meaning “no reasonable 
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.” PRE, 
508 U.S. at 60. Our application of this standard poses no threat 
to the uniformity of federal patent law. Consider our choices in 
this appeal: AbbVie and Besins’s lawsuits were or were not 
shams. If the former, it must be true that the patent law we 
apply is so clear that AbbVie and Besins were unreasonable in 
suing Teva or Perrigo for infringement and expecting to 
 
invalidation, see id. at 255, whereas the ’894 patent has not 
been invalidated. Indeed, while the ’894 patent expired on 
August 30, 2020, AbbVie and Besins may sue for infringement 
for up to six years after that date. See 35 U.S.C. § 286. We think 
this distinction is immaterial under Gunn, which emphasized 
that state-court adjudication of the legal malpractice claim 
would not change the result of the prior federal patent 
litigation, rather than emphasizing the result itself. See 568 
U.S. at 261. 
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succeed. Such a holding would effectively adjudicate the 
merits of an infringement claim but at no cost to uniformity. 
And the latter holding would mean only that AbbVie and 
Besins were not unreasonable in expecting success in their 
infringement suits. That conclusion would not undermine 
uniformity because it would not adjudicate the merits of the 
infringement claims. 
 Moreover, whether AbbVie and Besins’s infringement 
lawsuits were shams depends on whether the tangentiality 
exception to prosecution history estoppel applies. But the 
Federal Circuit has cautioned against applying analogical 
reasoning in determining tangentiality. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Hospira, Inc., 933 F.3d 1320, 1332 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[W]e 
find the analogies to other cases less helpful than a direct 
consideration of the specific record of this case and what it 
shows about the reason for amendment and the relation of that 
reason to the asserted equivalent.”). Because the Federal 
Circuit limits reliance on its own precedents in determining 
tangentiality, it follows that our decision in this appeal will 
have limited effect on the uniformity of patent law. Even 
setting Eli Lilly aside, however, the rarity of the patent-law 
issues these appeals present counsels in favor of our 
jurisdiction: the issues are not ones whose resolution will 
control numerous other cases. See Gunn, 568 U.S. at 262 
(quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 
U.S. 677, 700 (2006)). 
 Finally, here, as in Gunn, the preclusive effect of our 
ruling “would be limited to the parties and patents” before us. 
See 568 U.S. at 263. And the mere possibility that we might 
misunderstand patent law is not dispositive. See id. So the 
patent-law issues that the FTC’s sham-litigation theory 
presents are not “substantial.” Even if federal patent law were 
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a “necessary” element of one of the FTC’s well-pleaded 
claims, the latter basis for the Federal Circuit’s exclusive 
jurisdiction still would not apply. 
 Before concluding, we note a prudential consideration 
supporting our jurisdiction: “[u]nder the Federal Circuit’s 
choice-of-law rules, it would apply Third Circuit antitrust 
jurisprudence . . . when reviewing whether [the FTC] states[s 
a] plausible claim[] for relief under” a reverse-payment theory. 
Lipitor, 855 F.3d at 148 (citing Nobelpharma AB v. Implant 
Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (the 
Federal Circuit “appl[ies] the law of the appropriate regional 
circuit to issues involving other elements of antitrust law such 
as relevant market, market power, damages, etc., as those 
issues are not unique to patent law”)). The Federal Circuit 
would also apply our precedent when reviewing the District 
Court’s judgment on the sham-litigation theory, except when 
the judgment raised issues unique to patent law. See id. 
Needless to say, we are as capable of applying our own law as 
the Federal Circuit. And it makes eminent sense for this Court 
to develop our own law in this area. 
 In summary, neither basis for the Federal Circuit’s 
exclusive jurisdiction applies: federal patent law does not 
create the FTC’s cause of action, and the FTC’s right to relief 
does not necessarily depend on resolution of a substantial 
question of federal patent law. So this civil action does not 
“aris[e] under” federal patent law within the meaning of 28 





 Having assured ourselves of our jurisdiction, we turn to 
the merits of these cross-appeals. We hold the District Court 
erred by rejecting the reverse-payment theory and in 
concluding AbbVie and Besins’s litigation against Teva was a 
sham. The Court did not err, however, in concluding the 
Perrigo litigation was a sham and that AbbVie and Besins had 
monopoly power in the relevant market.  
A. The District Court erred by rejecting the 
reverse-payment theory. 
 We review the District Court’s dismissal order de novo. 
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(citation omitted). We must “accept all factual allegations as 
true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading 
of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Id. at 
231 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff 
relying on a reverse-payment theory must “allege facts 
sufficient to support the legal conclusion that the settlement at 
issue involves a large and unjustified reverse payment under 
Actavis.” In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 231, 252 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). 
1. Actavis 
 A reverse payment occurs when a patentee pays an 
alleged infringer to end a lawsuit. See Wellbutrin, 868 F.3d at 
142 n.3 (citing Actavis, 570 U.S. at 140–41). A typical reverse 
payment happens this way: “Company A sues Company B for 
patent infringement. The two companies settle under terms that 
require (1) Company B, the claimed infringer, not to produce 
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the patented product until the patent’s term expires, and (2) 
Company A, the patentee, to pay B many millions of dollars.” 
Actavis, 570 U.S. at 140.  
 Reverse payments can be anticompetitive in violation of 
the antitrust laws. Absent the reverse payment in the previous 
example, Company B might have prevailed by proving 
Company A’s patent invalid. Even if the patent were valid, 
Company B might prevail by showing it did not infringe. In 
either case, generic drugs would have entered the market 
before Company A’s patent was set to expire, and consumers 
would have benefited from lower drug prices.  
 In Actavis, the Supreme Court held reverse payments 
“can sometimes unreasonably diminish competition in 
violation of the antitrust laws.” Id. at 141. That case, like this 
one, involved AndroGel. See id. at 144. Solvay sued Actavis, 
Inc., a company seeking to market a generic version of the gel. 
See id. at 145. Solvay and Actavis settled under the following 
terms: (1) “Actavis agreed that it would not bring its generic to 
market until . . . 65 months before Solvay’s patent expired 
(unless someone else marketed a generic sooner)”; (2) 
“Actavis also agreed to promote AndroGel to urologists”; and 
(3) “Solvay agreed to pay . . . an estimated $19–$30 million 
annually, for nine years, to Actavis.” Id. “The companies 
described these payments as compensation for other services 
[Actavis] promised to perform.” Id. at 145. The FTC was 
unpersuaded. It sued Solvay and Actavis, contending the 
services had little value and the payments actually 
compensated the generics for delaying their market entry. See 
id. 
 The district court dismissed the FTC’s complaint, and 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
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affirmed. See id. at 145–46. Both courts applied the “scope of 
the patent” test, which provides that “absent sham litigation or 
fraud in obtaining the patent, a reverse payment settlement is 
immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive 
effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the 
patent.” Id. at 146 (citation omitted). This “categorical 
rule . . . relied on the premise that, because a patentee 
possesses a lawful right to keep others out of its market, the 
patentee may also enter into settlement agreements excluding 
potential patent challengers from entering that market.” 
Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 250 (citing Actavis, 570 U.S. at 146). The 
Eleventh Circuit was also concerned that antitrust review of 
reverse payments would undermine the general policy in favor 
of settlements and “require the parties to litigate the validity of 
the patent in order to demonstrate what would have happened 
to competition in the absence of the settlement.” Actavis, 570 
U.S. at 153. 
 The Supreme Court reversed. It first rejected the scope 
of the patent test. The infringement suit Solvay and Actavis 
settled “put the patent’s validity at issue, as well as its actual 
preclusive scope.” Actavis, 570 U.S. at 147. And the parties’ 
settlement was both “unusual” and potentially anticompetitive, 
because the FTC alleged Solvay “agreed to pay [Actavis] many 
millions of dollars to stay out of its market, even though 
[Actavis] did not have any claim that [Solvay] was 
liable . . . for damages.” Id. at 147–48. These factors persuaded 
the Court it would be “incongruous to determine antitrust 
legality by measuring the settlement’s anticompetitive effects 
solely against patent law policy, rather than measuring them 
against procompetitive antitrust policies as well.” Id. at 148. 
 The Court then held that for five reasons, the district 
court erred by dismissing the FTC’s complaint. See id. at 153. 
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First, reverse payments can be anticompetitive because they 
allow a brand-name company to split its monopoly profits with 
a generic company willing to delay market entry. See id. at 
153–56. Second, reverse payments’ “anticompetitive 
consequences will at least sometimes prove unjustified.” Id. at 
156. A defendant might show that “traditional settlement 
considerations, such as avoided litigation costs or fair value for 
services” justified the reverse payment. Id. Alternatively, 
antitrust review could reveal “a patentee is using its monopoly 
profits to avoid the risk of patent invalidation or a finding of 
noninfringement,” in which case the payment is not justified. 
Id. Third and fourth, the “size of [an] unexplained reverse 
payment can provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s 
weakness” and a patentee’s market power, “all without forcing 
a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the patent itself.” 
Id. at 157–58 (citation omitted). Fifth, subjecting reverse 
payments to antitrust review does not violate the general legal 
policy in favor of settlements, because companies can settle in 
other ways. See id. at 158. For example, a brand-name 
company may “allow[] the generic manufacturer to enter the 
patentee’s market prior to the patent’s expiration, without the 
patentee paying the challenger to stay out prior to that point.” 
Id. Thus, the Court concluded, “a reverse payment, where large 
and unjustified,” can violate the antitrust laws. Id. at 158–60 
(emphasis added). 
2. King Drug and Lipitor 
 Since the Supreme Court decided Actavis, we have 
applied its teachings on three occasions. See King Drug, 791 
F.3d at 393; Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 239; Wellbutrin, 868 F.3d at 
158. The parties to this appeal rely on King Drug and Lipitor. 
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 In King Drug, we reinstated a complaint challenging a 
settlement agreement in which the alleged reverse payment 
took a form other than cash. See 791 F.3d at 393. There, direct 
purchasers of the brand-name drug Lamictal sued its producer 
(GlaxoSmithKline (GSK)) and generic applicant (Teva) over 
their settlement of Teva’s challenge to the validity and 
enforceability of GSK’s patents on Lamictal’s active 
ingredient (lamotrigine). See id. Teva agreed to “end its 
challenge to GSK’s patent in exchange for early entry into the 
$50 million annual lamotrigine chewables market and GSK’s 
commitment not to produce its own, ‘authorized generic’ 
version of Lamictal tablets for the market alleged to be worth 
$2 billion annually.” Id. at 393–94. The purchasers claimed this 
“no-AG agreement” was a reverse payment under Actavis 
because it “was designed to induce Teva to abandon the patent 
fight and thereby agree to eliminate the risk of competition in 
the $2 billion lamotrigine tablet market.” Id. at 394. 
 Reversing the district court, we held the no-AG 
agreement was actionable under Actavis. See id. The district 
court had reasoned that “when the Supreme Court said 
‘payment’ it meant a payment of money.” Id. at 405 (quotation 
marks and citation omitted). We doubted “the Court intended 
to draw such a formal line.” Id. at 405–06. We explained that 
even though GSK did not pay Teva cash under the agreement, 
it was “likely to present the same types of problems as reverse 
payments of cash.” Id. at 404. The no-AG agreement could 
have been worth millions of dollars, if not hundreds of millions 
of dollars, to Teva. See id. Conversely, GSK’s commitment not 
to produce an authorized generic transferred to Teva “the 
profits [GSK] would have made from its authorized generic.” 
Id. at 405. Thus, the agreement may have been “something 
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more than just an agreed-upon early entry”—it may have been 
“pay-for-delay.” Id. 
 We also rejected the defendants’ counterargument that 
the purchasers’ “allegations [were] far too speculative to satisfy 
their burden of plausibly alleging that the settlement was 
anticompetitive.” Id. at 409 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Specifically, the defendants argued the purchasers needed to 
plead that without the reverse payment: GSK and Teva would 
have negotiated an alternative, more competitive agreement; 
continued litigation ending in settlement would have yielded a 
more competitive result; and Teva would have launched its 
generics. See id.  
 We held the purchasers stated a claim. They alleged: 
GSK agreed not to launch an authorized generic during Teva’s 
180-day exclusivity period; the agreement was worth “many 
millions of dollars of additional revenue”; GSK would 
otherwise be incentivized to launch an authorized generic; 
Teva likely would have launched alongside GSK; and GSK’s 
patent was likely to be invalidated. See id. at 409–10. “And 
although [the purchasers] concede[d] that Teva entered the 
lamotrigine chewables market about 37 months early . . . the 
chewables market, allegedly worth only $50 million annually, 
was orders of magnitude smaller than the alleged $2 billion 
tablet market the agreement [was] said to have protected.” Id. 
at 410. Because the purchasers had plausibly alleged that “any 
procompetitive aspects of the chewables arrangement were 
outweighed by the anticompetitive harm from the no-AG 
agreement,” they were entitled to discovery. Id. 
 We also rejected the district court’s alternative holding 
that “the settlement . . . would survive Actavis scrutiny and 
[was] reasonable.” Id. at 410–11. The purchasers were entitled 
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to discovery because they plausibly alleged the settlement was 
anticompetitive. See id. at 411. And “[i]f genuine issues of 
material fact remain[ed] after discovery, the rule-of-reason 
analysis [would be] for the finder of fact, not the court as a 
matter of law.” Id. 
 Next, in Lipitor, we addressed consolidated appeals 
concerning two drugs: Lipitor and Effexor XR. See 868 F.3d 
at 239. In the Lipitor litigation, we reinstated a complaint 
alleging a generic applicant delayed entry into the market in 
exchange for the brand-name producer settling a damages 
claim for much less than the claim was really worth. See id. at 
253–54. There, the plaintiffs were a putative class of direct 
purchasers, a putative class of end payors, and several 
individual retailers. See id. at 241. They sued Lipitor’s brand-
name producer (Pfizer Inc.) and its generic applicant (Ranbaxy 
Inc.) over a “near-global” litigation settlement addressing 
“scores of patent litigations [between Pfizer and Ranbaxy] 
around the world.” Id. at 244. One part of that settlement 
resolved Ranbaxy’s challenge to the validity and enforceability 
of Pfizer’s patents on Lipitor. See id. at 242. It provided 
Ranbaxy would delay its entry, “thus extending Pfizer’s 
exclusivity in the Lipitor market” past the expiration of its 
patents. Id. at 244–45. Another part of the settlement resolved 
Pfizer’s claim against Ranbaxy for allegedly infringing 
Pfizer’s patents on Accupril, a different drug. Id. at 243–44. 
Before settling, Pfizer had reason to believe its claim was 
worth hundreds of millions of dollars: Accupril’s annual sales 
were “over $500 million”; Ranbaxy’s generic entry 
“decimated” those sales; Pfizer sought treble damages for 
willful infringement; and the district court granted Pfizer a 
preliminary injunction and Pfizer posted a $200 million bond. 
Id. Pfizer had also “expressed confidence that it would succeed 
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in obtaining a substantial monetary judgment from Ranbaxy.” 
Id. at 244. Nevertheless, Pfizer agreed to settle this claim for a 
mere $1 million. See id. 
 Reversing the district court, we held these two, 
otherwise-unrelated parts of the global settlement agreement 
were actionable under Actavis. See id. at 248, 253. The court 
had required the plaintiffs to plead a “reliable” monetary 
estimate of the dropped Accupril claims so it could determine 
whether the reverse payment was large and unjustified. See id. 
at 254. We rejected that requirement, explaining it “heightened 
[the] pleading standard contrary to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 
[550 U.S. 544 (2007)], and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, [556 U.S. 662 
(2009)].” Id. Moreover, we said neither Actavis nor King Drug 
“demanded [that] level of detail.” Id. at 254. 
 In fact, the plaintiffs’ allegations “easily match[ed], if 
not exceed[ed], the level of specificity and detail of those in 
Actavis and King Drug.” Id. at 253, 255. As relevant here, the 
plaintiffs alleged:  
Ranbaxy launched a generic version of Pfizer’s 
brand drug Accupril “at risk” [of 
infringement] . . . ; Pfizer had annual Accupril 
sales over $500 million prior to Ranbaxy’s 
launch . . . ; Pfizer brought suit and sought to 
enjoin Ranbaxy’s generic sales . . . ; the District 
Court granted the injunction halting Ranbaxy’s 
sales of generic Accupril, which the Federal 
Circuit affirmed . . . ; Pfizer posted ‘a $200 
million bond in conjunction with’ the injunction 
and informed the Court that Ranbaxy’s generic 
sales ‘decimated’ its Accupril sales . . . ; Pfizer’s 
suit was likely to be successful . . . ; and Pfizer 
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itself made statements about Ranbaxy’s 
exposure . . . .  
Id. at 253. The plaintiffs also alleged the release of the Accupril 
claims was unjustified because the “potential liability in 
Accupril ‘far exceeded’ any of Pfizer’s saved litigation costs or 
any services provided by Ranbaxy.” Id. Thus, we held the 
plaintiffs “sufficiently allege[d] that Pfizer agreed to release 
the Accupril claims against Ranbaxy, which were likely to 
succeed and worth hundreds of millions of dollars, in exchange 
for Ranbaxy’s delay in the release of its generic version of 
Lipitor.” Id. 
 The defendants countered that the plaintiffs did not 
address other parts of the global litigation settlement that might 
well have justified the alleged reverse payment. But because 
the defendants had the burden of justifying a reverse payment, 
Actavis did not “require antitrust plaintiffs to come up with 
possible explanations for the reverse payment and then rebut 
those explanations.” Id. at 256. The defendants also countered 
that because Ranbaxy paid Pfizer $1 million, it was a 
commonplace settlement to which Actavis does not apply. Id. 
at 257. We said this argument “[could not] be squared with 
Actavis” because “[i]f parties could shield their settlements 
from antitrust review by simply including a token payment by 
the purportedly infringing generic manufacturer, then 
otherwise unlawful reverse payment settlement agreements 
attempting to eliminate the risk of competition would escape 
review.” Id. at 258. 
 Similarly, in the Effexor XR litigation, we reinstated a 
complaint alleging a generic applicant delayed entry into the 
Effexor market in exchange for the brand-name producer’s 
agreement not to market an authorized generic—even though 
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the generic agreed to pay some royalties to the brand. See id. 
at 254, 247. There, the plaintiffs were a putative class of end 
payors, two third-party payors, and several retailers. See id. at 
246. They sued Effexor’s generic applicant (Teva) and brand-
name producer (Wyeth, Inc.) over their settlement of Teva’s 
challenge to the validity and enforceability of Wyeth’s patents 
on Effexor. See id. at 247. Under the settlement, Teva and 
Wyeth agreed to vacate a district court ruling construing the 
patent claims unfavorably to Wyeth. See id. They further 
agreed that Teva could market the extended-release version of 
its generic nearly seven years before Wyeth’s patent expired, 
and its instant-release version at some point before the patent 
expired. See id. In exchange, Wyeth agreed it would not market 
authorized generics during Teva’s 180-day exclusivity period. 
See id. In return, Teva agreed to pay Wyeth royalties. See id. 
 Reversing the district court, we held the no-AG 
agreement was actionable under Actavis. Given the similarities 
between King Drug and the Effexor litigation, we will not 
repeat the Effexor plaintiffs’ allegations here. See id. at 258–
59. We mention the Effexor litigation only to highlight two 
counterarguments the defendants made. First, the defendants 
argued “the reverse payment was not large because the 
complaints failed to sufficiently allege that Wyeth would have 
released an authorized generic but for its settlement agreement 
with Teva.” Id. They explained that “Wyeth has rarely 
introduced authorized generics in response to the entry of a 
generic into one of their branded drugs’ markets.” Id. at 260. 
We rejected this argument because the mere fact that “Wyeth 
does not typically introduce authorized generics into the 
market” did not “render[] [the plaintiffs’] allegations about the 
value of the no-AG agreement implausible.” Id. at 260–61. 
Second, the defendants argued the royalties Teva agreed to pay 
45 
 
Wyeth justified the reverse payment. See id. We responded that 
“[a]lthough the royalty licensing provisions will perhaps be a 
valid defense, they require factual assessments, economic 
calculations, and expert analysis that are inappropriate at the 
pleading stage.” Id. at 261. In sum, we said, “Effexor plaintiffs 
need not have valued the no-AG agreement beyond their 
allegations summarized above . . . Nor were they required to 
counter potential defenses at the pleading stage.” Id. at 262 
(citation omitted). 
3. Application 
 Two principles emerge from King Drug and Lipitor. 
First, a reverse payment’s legality depends mainly on its 
economic substance, not its form. The alleged reverse payment 
in Actavis was made in cash. Yet the alleged reverse payments 
in King Drug and Lipitor included two no-AG agreements and 
the settlement of a valuable damages claim. The reverse 
payment in Actavis was part of a single settlement agreement 
addressing one drug (AndroGel). Yet the reverse payment in 
the Lipitor litigation spanned two parts of a “near-global” 
litigation settlement addressing two different drugs (Lipitor 
and Accupril); and in King Drug, the challenged settlement 
addressed a drug in two different forms (chewable and tablet). 
Finally, the settlement in Actavis did not provide for cash to 
flow from the generic entrant to the brand-name producer. Yet 
the settlements in Lipitor provided for Ranbaxy to pay Pfizer 
$1 million and for Teva to pay Wyeth royalties.  
 However meaningful these formalisms may be in other 
areas of the law, they are disfavored in antitrust. The purpose 
of antitrust law is “to protect consumers from arrangements 
that prevent competition in the marketplace.” King Drug, 791 
F.3d at 406 (citations omitted). Because of that unique purpose, 
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“economic realities rather than a formalistic approach must 
govern.” United States v. Dentsply, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 189 (3d 
Cir. 2005). Accordingly, in King Drug and Lipitor, we read 
Actavis practically; we read it to apply to potentially 
anticompetitive reverse payments regardless of their form. 
 The second principle emerging from King Drug and 
Lipitor is that the law of pleading applies to reverse-payment 
theories. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must 
“allege facts sufficient to support the legal conclusion that the 
settlement at issue involves a large and unjustified reverse 
payment under Actavis.” Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 252 (citation 
omitted). A plaintiff can meet this pleading standard without 
describing in perfect detail the world without the reverse 
payment, calculating reliably the payment’s exact size, or pre-
empting every possible explanation for it. Moreover, a district 
court must accept a plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations as true. 
If a plaintiff plausibly alleges that an agreement’s 
anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive virtues, 
the district court must accept that allegation and allow the 
plaintiff to take discovery. If genuine issues of material fact 
remain, the rule-of-reason analysis is for the factfinder, not the 
court.  
 Applying these precedents here, the District Court erred 
by dismissing the FTC’s claims to the extent they relied on a 
reverse payment theory. The FTC plausibly alleged an 
anticompetitive reverse payment. It alleged AbbVie and Besins 
filed sham lawsuits against Teva and Perrigo in order to trigger 
the automatic, 30-month stay of FDA approval on its generic 
version of AndroGel. App. 4440 ¶ 99. But those suits “did not 
eliminate the threat of Teva’s . . . products to [AbbVie] and 
Besins’s monopoly,” because AbbVie and Teva both expected 
Teva would win the infringement suit against it and would 
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introduce its generic in 2012—before 30 months had passed. 
App. 4441 ¶¶ 107–09. So “[AbbVie] and Besins . . . turned to 
other ways to preserve their monopoly.” App. 4442 ¶ 111. 
Specifically, AbbVie “approached Teva to discuss a potential 
settlement” that would give “[AbbVie] time to shift sales to its 
reformulated product, AndroGel 1.62%.” Id. ¶ 112. Teva 
agreed to “drop its patent challenge and refrain from competing 
with [AndroGel] until December 2014.” App. 4443 ¶ 115. In 
exchange, it asked AbbVie to sell it a “supply of . . . TriCor.” 
Id. ¶ 113. AbbVie agreed. It authorized Teva to sell a generic 
version of TriCor, which AbbVie would supply to Teva at 
Teva’s option, for a four-year term beginning in November 
2012. Id. ¶ 117. The supply agreement provided for Teva to 
pay AbbVie the costs of production, an additional percentage 
of that cost, and a royalty. See id. 
 The payment was plausibly “large.” The FTC alleges 
the supply of TriCor was “extremely valuable” to Teva. App. 
4444 ¶ 120. A previous settlement between AbbVie and Teva 
had set Teva’s entry in the TriCor market for July 2012. App. 
4442 ¶ 114. And because Teva was the first generic challenger 
to TriCor, Teva was entitled to 180 days of marketing 
exclusivity. See id. Teva was struggling to capitalize on the 
exclusivity period, though, because it could not secure FDA 
approval for its generic drug. See id. The TriCor deal enabled 
Teva “to secure generic TriCor revenues in 2012 and its first 
mover advantage.” App. 4444–45 ¶¶ 121, 124. Teva expected 
its “net sales of authorized generic TriCor sales would be 
nearly $175 million over a four-year period.” App. 4444 ¶ 120. 
In fact, Teva’s actual sales were much higher. Id. They “far 
exceed[ed]” the litigation costs that AbbVie, Besins, or Teva 
saved by settling. App. 4445 ¶ 122. And they exceeded what 
Teva had projected it was likely to earn by winning the 
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infringement suit and marketing its generic version of 
AndroGel. Id. ¶ 123. 
 The payment was also plausibly “unjustified.” The FTC 
alleges the TriCor deal “cannot be explained as an independent 
business deal from Abbott’s perspective.” App. 4445 ¶ 125. 
AbbVie “had no incentive to increase . . . generic competition 
from Teva on another of its blockbuster products.” App. 4443 
¶ 115. And the TriCor deal was “highly unusual” in other 
respects. App. 4445 ¶ 126. For example, it did not condition 
Teva’s launch on the launch of an independent generic. App. 
4445–46 ¶ 126. It actually accelerated generic entry, because 
“Teva’s launch triggered provisions in [AbbVie’s] agreements 
with other generic TriCor ANDA filers allowing them to 
launch their own generic[ versions].” App. 4446–47 ¶ 129. 
Moreover, the royalty terms were “significantly worse for 
[AbbVie]” than is usual in authorized-generic agreements, 
including contemporaneous agreements that AbbVie entered. 
App. 4447 ¶ 130. AbbVie expected to lose roughly $100 
million in TriCor revenues as a result of the deal, and its 
“modest income from the . . . deal did not come close to 
making up this significant loss of revenue.” Id. ¶ 132. 
 Finally, it is plausible that the anticompetitive effects of 
AbbVie’s settlement with Teva outweighed any 
procompetitive virtues of the TriCor deal. The FTC alleges 
AbbVie calculated that it would sacrifice $100 million in 
TriCor sales, but that was a small fraction of the billions of 
dollars in AndroGel revenue it protected by deferring 
competition in the TTRT market for three years. See id.; cf. 
King Drug, 791 F.3d at 410 (purchasers were entitled to 
discovery because they plausibly alleged that “any 
procompetitive aspects of the chewables arrangement were 
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outweighed by the anticompetitive harm from the no-AG 
agreement”). 
 These allegations, if true, would “support the legal 
conclusion that the settlement at issue involves a large and 
unjustified reverse payment.” Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 252. So the 
District Court erred by dismissing the FTC’s claims to the 
extent they relied on a reverse-payment theory. 
 The District Court ruled that “when two agreements are 
involved . . . the court must determine separately whether each 
promotes competition.” AbbVie, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 437 (citing 
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 
(2009)). The Court then reasoned AbbVie’s settlement with 
Teva promoted competition and was distinguishable from the 
settlement in Actavis. In Actavis, the patentee paid the alleged 
infringer. But here, the Court said, AbbVie and Besins “did not 
make any payment, reverse or otherwise, to . . . Teva.” Id. at 
436. Instead, they “simply allow[ed] Teva to enter the 
AndroGel market almost six years prior to the expiration of the 
’894 patent.” Id. It further stated that because “Actavis 
specifically states that such an agreement does not run afoul of 
the antitrust laws,” the settlement was procompetitive and 
unactionable. Id. (citation omitted).  
 The District Court next reasoned the TriCor deal 
promoted competition because “[i]t allow[ed] Teva to enter the 
cholesterol drug market with a generic product to compete with 
Abbott’s product and thus advantage[d] the purchasers of 
cholesterol drugs.” Id. The Court stressed that while 
“something of large value passed from [AbbVie] to Teva, it 
was not a reverse payment under Actavis” because AbbVie was 
“not making any payments to Teva.” Id. Rather, Teva was 
“paying [AbbVie] for the supply of TriCor.” Id. And even 
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though the FTC alleged AbbVie was “charging a price that is 
well below what is customary in such situations,” it did not 
allege AbbVie “agreed to sell TriCor . . . for less than its cost.” 
Id. Thus, the Court held the deal was procompetitive. Id. 
 The District Court’s reasoning is unpersuasive. The 
Court cited Linkline for the proposition that if a settlement 
involves two agreements, a court must determine separately 
whether each promotes competition. But Linkline held “two 
antitrust theories cannot be combined to form a new theory of 
antitrust liability.” ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 
254, 280 (3d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (citing Linkline, 555 
U.S. at 457). The FTC’s complaint does not allege such a 
combination, so Linkline does not apply. 
 Nor do our precedents support the rule that “when two 
agreements are involved . . . [a] court must determine 
separately whether each promotes competition.” AbbVie, 107 
F. Supp. 3d at 437 (citation omitted). That rule violates two 
principles from our precedents. It elevates form over substance 
because companies could avoid liability for anticompetitive 
reverse payments simply by structuring them as two separate 
agreements—one in which the generic company agrees to 
delay entry until patent expiration, and the other in which the 
brand-name company agrees to split monopoly profits. In 
effect, Actavis would become a penalty for bad corporate 
lawyering instead of anticompetitive conduct. The rule also 
contradicts pleading law. Here, the FTC plausibly alleged that 
AbbVie’s settlement with Teva and the TriCor deal were 
linked. The Court had to accept that allegation as true. See 
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 230–31. 
 We are also unpersuaded by the District Court’s 
economic analyses of the TriCor deal and AbbVie’s settlement 
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with Teva. As to the TriCor deal, the Court acknowledged that 
“something of large value passed from [AbbVie] to Teva.” 
AbbVie, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 436. Yet it said that transfer could 
not be a reverse payment under Actavis because AbbVie was 
not “making any payments to Teva.” Id. This reasoning cannot 
be reconciled with King Drug, where we held a plaintiff may 
base a reverse-payment theory on any “unexplained large 
transfer of value from the patent holder to the alleged 
infringer.” King Drug, 791 F.3d at 403 (emphasis added).  
Moreover, the Court emphasized that Teva paid AbbVie 
for the supply of TriCor. But in Lipitor, we held that parties 
cannot “shield their settlements from antitrust review by 
simply including a token payment by the purportedly 
infringing generic manufacturer.” 868 F.3d at 258. Although 
Teva’s payments “will perhaps be a valid defense, they require 
factual assessments, economic calculations, and expert 
analysis that are inappropriate at the pleading stage.” Id. at 261. 
Finally, the Court intimated the result might be different if the 
FTC had alleged AbbVie agreed to sell TriCor below-cost. But 
the FTC did not have to allege the TriCor deal would appear as 
a loss on AbbVie’s balance sheets; it needed only to allege that 
through the deal, AbbVie unjustifiably transferred to Teva an 
opportunity, and the profits associated with the opportunity 
were large. See King Drug, 791 F.3d at 405 (GSK’s 
commitment not to produce an authorized generic transferred 
to Teva “the profits [GSK] would have made from its 
authorized generic”) (emphasis added). So without expressing 
an opinion whether the District Court correctly concluded the 
TriCor deal was procompetitive, we think it analyzed 
incorrectly the deal’s economic substance. 
 As to AbbVie’s settlement with Teva, the District Court 
erred in concluding it was procompetitive as a matter of law. 
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Granted, the District Court was right that under Actavis, “an 
agreement does not run afoul of the antitrust laws” if it simply 
allows a generic company to enter a market before patent 
expiration. AbbVie, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 436 (citing Actavis, 570 
U.S. at 158 (“[Parties] may, as in other industries, settle in 
other ways, for example, by allowing the generic manufacturer 
to enter the patentee’s market prior to the patent’s expiration, 
without the patentee paying the challenger to stay out prior to 
that point.”) (emphasis added)). And it was reasonable for the 
Court to think this exception reflects the Supreme Court’s view 
that such agreements are so often procompetitive they should 
be legal per se. Still, the exception applies only if a patentee 
does not “pay[] the challenger to stay out [before patent 
expiration],” and the District Court erred in concluding this 
condition was met here. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 158. The Court 
said AbbVie “did not make any payment, reverse or otherwise, 
to . . . Teva.” AbbVie, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 436. But that finding 
rested on the Court’s erroneous ruling that it had to analyze the 
settlement separately from the TriCor deal, which even the 
Court acknowledged involved a transfer of value from AbbVie 
to Teva. Because the FTC plausibly alleged the TriCor deal 
was a reverse payment, the settlement may have been 
“something more than just an agreed-upon early entry”—it 
may have been “pay-for-delay.” King Drug, 791 F.3d at 405. 
And pay-for-delay is anticompetitive even if the delay does not 
continue past patent expiration. It was this same 
anticompetitive potential that led the Supreme Court to reject 
the scope of the patent test in Actavis. See 570 U.S. at 147–48. 
 For these reasons, the District Court erred by dismissing 




B. The District Court erred in concluding AbbVie and 
Besins’s litigation against Teva was a sham; it did 
not err in concluding the Perrigo litigation was a 
sham. 
1. Noerr-Pennington immunity 
 Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, “[t]hose who 
petition [the] government for redress are generally immune 
from antitrust liability.” PRE, 508 U.S. at 56. That includes the 
right to sue in federal court. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 515 (1972) (holding “the right 
to petition extends to all departments of the Government,” 
including the courts).  
 Noerr-Pennington immunity is not absolute. 
Wellbutrin, 868 F.3d at 148. An exception arises if a lawsuit is 
“a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an 
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of 
a competitor.” E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961). In PRE, the Supreme 
Court held this exception has two prongs: 
First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in 
the sense that no reasonable litigant could 
realistically expect success on the merits. If an 
objective litigant could conclude that the suit is 
reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable 
outcome, the suit is immunized under Noerr, and 
an antitrust claim premised on the sham 
exception must fail. Only if challenged litigation 
is objectively meritless may a court examine the 
litigant’s subjective motivation. Under this 
second part of our definition of sham, the court 
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should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit 
conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the 
business relationships of a competitor through 
the use of the governmental process—as 
opposed to the outcome of that process—as an 
anticompetitive weapon. This two-tiered process 
requires the plaintiff to disprove the challenged 
lawsuit’s legal viability before the court will 
entertain evidence of the 
suit’s economic viability. 
508 U.S. at 60–61 (internal quotation marks, citations, 
alteration, and footnote omitted). Under the objective 
baselessness prong, a “probable cause determination 
irrefutably demonstrates” a defendant’s immunity. Id. at 63. 
Probable cause is a “reasonable belief that there is a chance that 
a claim may be held valid upon adjudication.” Id. at 62–63 
(internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted); 
see also id. at 65 (defendant was immune because “[a]ny 
reasonable [litigant] in [its] position could have believed that it 
had some chance of winning”). In determining reasonableness, 
a court should consider the state of the law at the time of a 
defendant’s suit. See id. at 65; see also Wellbutrin, 868 F.3d at 
150. Generally, the more “unsettled” the law is, the more 
reasonable is a belief that a claim will be held valid. PRE, 508 
U.S. at 64–65 (probable cause supports a claim if it is 
“arguably ‘warranted by existing law’”) (quoting FED. R. CIV. 
P. 11). Even if the law was settled against the defendant, 
however, that is not dispositive. Then, a court should ask 
whether the defendant’s claim “at the very least was based on 
an objectively ‘good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law.’” Id. at 65 (quoting 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11).  
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 Under the subjective motivation prong, a plaintiff must 
show the defendant “brought baseless claims in an attempt to 
thwart competition (i.e., in bad faith).” Octane Fitness, LLC v. 
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 556 (2014). Some 
factors relating to a defendant’s “economic motivations” in 
bringing suit include whether the defendant was “indifferent to 
the outcome on the merits of the . . . suit, whether any damages 
for infringement would be too low to justify . . . investment in 
the suit, or whether [the defendant] had decided to sue 
primarily for the benefit of collateral injuries inflicted through 
the use of legal process.” PRE, 508 U.S. at 65–66 (citation 
omitted).  
 Generally, a plaintiff seeking to show the sham 
litigation exception faces “an uphill battle.” Wellbutrin, 868 
F.3d at 147. And in some respects, the hill is steeper “in the 
context of an ANDA case.” Id. at 149. “Since the submission 
of an ANDA is, by statutory definition, an infringing act, an 
infringement suit filed in response to an ANDA with a 
paragraph IV certification could only be objectively baseless if 
no reasonable person could disagree with the assertions of 
noninfringement or invalidity in the certification.” Id. (citation 
omitted). Moreover, the number of lawsuits a brand-name drug 
manufacturer files will sometimes reveal little about its 
subjective motivation for suing, because the Hatch-Waxman 
Act “incentivizes [brands] to promptly file patent infringement 
suits by rewarding them with a stay of up to 30 months if they 
do so.” Id. at 157–58 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)). For 
that reason, we have declined to apply a related exception to 
Noerr-Pennington immunity—serial petitioning—in the 
Hatch-Waxman context. Id. (citing Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC 
v. Village Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2015)). 
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 Yet in other respects, the ANDA context may help a 
plaintiff. The automatic, 30-month stay is a collateral injury the 
defendant’s mere use of legal process invariably inflicts. And 
though the stay ends if a court holds the defendant’s patent is 
invalid or has not been infringed, it does not otherwise depend 
on a suit’s outcome. Thus, a plaintiff may be able to show a 
defendant was indifferent to the outcome of its infringement 
suit, and the automatic, 30-month stay was an anticompetitive 
weapon the defendant tried to wield. 
 In sum, applying the sham-litigation standard is a 
delicate task. The defendant’s First Amendment right “to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances” is at stake. 
U.S. Const. amend. I. So too is congressional policy, as 
expressed in both the Hatch-Waxman Act and the antitrust 
laws. We must not “penalize a brand-name manufacturer 
whose ‘litigiousness was a product of Hatch-Waxman.’” 
Wellbutrin, 868 F.3d. at 158 (citing Kaiser Found. Health 
Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 552 F.3d 1033, 1047 (9th Cir. 
2009)). “Doing so would punish behavior that Congress sought 
to encourage.” Id. (citation omitted). At the same time, we must 
not immunize a brand-name manufacturer who uses the Hatch-
Waxman Act’s automatic, 30-month stay to thwart 
competition. Doing so would excuse behavior that Congress 
proscribed in the antitrust laws. 
2. Objective Baselessness 
 The District Court granted the FTC summary judgment 
on sham litigation’s objective baselessness prong. We review 
that judgment de novo. See Morgan v. Covington Twp., 648 
F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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a. Patent law’s doctrine of equivalents, 
prosecution history estoppel, and tangentiality 
 Under the doctrine of equivalents, “[t]he scope of a 
patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead embraces all 
equivalents to the claims described.” Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 
732. There are at least two reasons for this doctrine. First, 
because “the nature of language makes it impossible to capture 
the essence of a thing in a patent application,” it is unrealistic 
to expect a patentee to “capture every nuance of [his or her] 
invention or describe with complete precision the range of its 
novelty.” Id. at 731. Second, “[i]f patents were always 
interpreted by their literal terms,” rival inventors might “defeat 
the patent” simply by making “unimportant and insubstantial” 
changes. Id. This would diminish the scientific and artistic 
progress that the patent system seeks to foster. See id. 
 Although the doctrine of equivalents counters the threat 
that literal interpretation of patents poses to scientific and 
artistic progress, it creates another problem. One function of 
patents is to notify would-be inventors about the scope of the 
patentee’s property right. See id. (“A patent holder should 
know what he owns, and the public should know what he does 
not.”). Notice allows inventors to innovate without fear that the 
patentee will sue them for infringement. See id. at 732. But 
because the doctrine of equivalents untethers a patentee’s 
property right from a patent’s literal terms, it tends to 
undermine notice. See id. So the doctrine risks dampening 
inventors’ innovative spirit.  
 Thus, patent law must balance “the needs of patentees 
for adequate protection of their inventions” on the one hand, 
and “the needs of would-be competitors for adequate notice of 
the scope of that protection” on the other. Festo Corp. v. 
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Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (“Festo IX”), 344 F.3d 
1359, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). 
 Recognizing the need for balance, the Supreme Court 
has limited the doctrine of equivalents. One limitation—known 
as prosecution history estoppel—applies when “the patentee 
originally claimed the subject matter alleged to infringe but 
then narrowed the claim in response to a rejection.” Festo VIII, 
535 U.S. at 733. The patentee “may not argue that the 
surrendered territory comprised unforeseen subject matter that 
should be deemed equivalent to the literal claims of the issued 
patent.” Id. at 733–34.  
 Prosecution history estoppel “ensures that the doctrine 
of equivalents remains tied to its underlying purpose.” Id. at 
734. “The doctrine of equivalents is premised on language’s 
inability to capture the essence of innovation.” Id. But that 
premise is unsound if a patent’s prosecution history shows that 
the patentee “turned his attention to the subject matter in 
question, knew the words for both the broader and narrower 
claim, and affirmatively chose the latter.” Id. at 734–35. In that 
case, the patentee’s competitors could reasonably infer the 
patentee’s property right extended only so far as the narrower 
claim.  
 Courts use a three-part test to determine whether 
prosecution history estoppel applies: 
1. The first question in a prosecution history 
estoppel inquiry is whether an amendment filed 
in the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has 
narrowed the literal scope of a claim. . . . If the 
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amendment was not narrowing, then prosecution 
history estoppel does not apply.  
2. If the accused infringer establishes that the 
amendment was a narrowing one, then the 
second question is whether the reason for that 
amendment was a substantial one relating to 
patentability. . . . When the prosecution 
history record reveals no reason for the 
narrowing amendment, [the Supreme Court’s 
decision in] Warner–Jenkinson [Co. v. Hilton 
Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997)] presumes 
that the patentee had a substantial reason relating 
to patentability; consequently, the patentee must 
show that the reason for the amendment was not 
one relating to patentability if it is to rebut that 
presumption. . . . In this regard, . . . a patentee’s 
rebuttal of the Warner–Jenkinson presumption is 
restricted to the evidence in the prosecution 
history record. . . . If the patentee successfully 
establishes that the amendment was not for a 
reason of patentability, then prosecution history 
estoppel does not apply. 
3. If, however, the court determines that a 
narrowing amendment has been made for a 
substantial reason relating to 
patentability . . . then the third question in a 
prosecution history estoppel analysis addresses 
the scope of the subject matter surrendered by the 
narrowing amendment. . . . At that point Festo 
VIII imposes the presumption that the patentee 
has surrendered all territory between the original 
claim limitation and the amended claim 
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limitation. . . . The patentee may rebut that 
presumption of total surrender by demonstrating 
that it did not surrender the particular equivalent 
in question . . . Finally, if the patentee fails to 
rebut the Festo presumption, then prosecution 
history estoppel bars the patentee from relying 
on the doctrine of equivalents for the accused 
element. If the patentee successfully rebuts the 
presumption, then prosecution history estoppel 
does not apply and the question whether the 
accused element is in fact equivalent to the 
limitation at issue is reached on the merits. 
Festo IX, 344 F.3d at 1366–67 (internal citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). To rebut the presumption of total surrender, 
a patentee “must show that at the time of the amendment one 
skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have 
drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the 
alleged equivalent.” Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 741. 
 One way a patentee can meet this high standard is by 
showing “the rationale underlying the narrowing amendment 
[bore] no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in 
question.” Festo IX, 344 F.3d at 1369 (internal citation 
omitted). This is the tangentiality exception to prosecution 
history estoppel. In determining whether an amendment was 
tangential to an equivalent, a court does not consider the 
patentee’s subjective motivation for narrowing his claims. That 
approach would overlook “the public notice function of a 
patent and its prosecution history.” Id. (citations omitted). 
Instead, the court considers the “objectively apparent” 
motivation as suggested by the prosecution history. Id. 
Although the tangentiality exception generally cannot be 
reduced to hard-and-fast rules, see id. at 1368, one rule is clear: 
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“an amendment made to avoid prior art that contains the 
equivalent in question is not tangential,” id. at 1369 (citation 
omitted). 
 Like prosecution history estoppel, the tangentiality 
exception balances the needs of patentees and would-be 
competitors. It also ensures the doctrine of equivalents remains 
tied to its underlying purpose. If the rationale for an 
amendment is tangential to the alleged equivalent, “one skilled 
in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a 
claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged 
equivalent.” Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 741. Thus, a patentee’s 
competitors could not infer the patentee “turned his attention 
to the subject matter in question, knew the words for both the 
broader and narrower claim, and affirmatively chose the latter.” 
Id. at 734–35. By the same token, however, the tangentiality 
exception does not apply if the rationale for an amendment is 
to avoid prior art that contains the alleged equivalent. Then the 
prior art itself teaches the patentee how to draft a claim that 
literally encompasses the equivalent. And because the patentee 
turned his attention to the prior art in order to avoid it, the 
patentee’s competitors could infer the patentee affirmatively 
chose the narrower claim. 
b. The District Court erred in concluding AbbVie 
and Besins’s suit against Teva was objectively 
baseless. 
 Teva’s paragraph IV notice asserted that because its gel 
used the penetration enhancer isopropyl palmitate instead of 
isopropyl myristate, the gel did not literally infringe the ’894 
patent. It also argued the ’894 patent’s prosecution history 
estopped AbbVie and Besins from claiming infringement on 
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the ground that isopropyl palmitate is equivalent to isopropyl 
myristate.  
 On appeal, AbbVie and Besins concede the October 
2001 amendment—which narrowed the patent application’s 
claim 1 from all penetration enhancers to a list of 24 not 
including isopropyl palmitate—was narrowing and was made 
for a substantial reason related to patentability. See Festo IX, 
344 F.3d at 1366 (citation omitted). Thus, we presume AbbVie 
and Besins “surrendered all territory between the original 
claim limitation and the amended claim limitation,” which 
includes isopropyl palmitate. Id. at 1367 (citing Festo VIII, 535 
U.S. at 740). To rebut this presumption, AbbVie and Besins 
would have had to show that “at the time of the [October 2001] 
amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be 
expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally 
encompassed [isopropyl palmitate].” Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 
741. AbbVie and Besins argue they could make this showing. 
They contend the reason for the October 2001 amendment was 
to overcome Mak’s use of oleic acid—not Allen’s disclosure 
of isopropyl palmitate or other penetration enhancers. So, they 
claim, the rationale for the amendment was tangential to 
isopropyl palmitate. See Festo IX, 344 F.3d at 1369 (internal 
citation omitted). 
 The FTC has not shown that no reasonable litigant in 
AbbVie and Besins’s position would believe it had a chance of 
winning. See PRE, 508 U.S. at 65. AbbVie and Besins’s 
argument has support in the prosecution history record. Allen 
disclosed isopropyl myristate—the penetration enhancer used 
in AndroGel—and yet the October 2001 amendment retained 
isopropyl myristate. Moreover, AbbVie and Besins gave three 
reasons why the prior art did not suggest combining Mak and 
Allen. Every one of those reasons distinguished the claimed 
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penetration enhancers from oleic acid, the penetration 
enhancer Mak used. Finally, expert testimony could have 
supported AbbVie and Besins’s interpretation of the 
prosecution history. See Festo IX, 344 F.3d at 1369–70. The 
District Court heard testimony from Dr. Jonathan Hadgraft, 
Emeritus Professor of Biophysical Chemistry at University 
College London School of Pharmacy. He testified the 
“chemical and functional differences identified by the patent 
applicants in their rationale for distinguishing the penetration 
enhancers listed in the claims in the [October 2001] 
amendment . . . from oleic acid would apply equally to 
isopropyl palmitate.” App. 4511. For these reasons, AbbVie 
and Besins could reasonably have argued that at the time of the 
October 2001 amendment, one skilled in the art could not 
reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have 
literally encompassed isopropyl palmitate. See Festo VIII, 535 
U.S. at 741. In that case, prosecution history estoppel would 
not apply. See id. 
 The FTC presents three main counterarguments.  
 First, the District Court concluded the rationale for the 
October 2001 amendment was not tangential to isopropyl 
palmitate because “[i]f AbbVie and Besins merely sought to 
relinquish oleic acid and no other penetration enhancer in 
October 2001, they easily could have said so.” AbbVie, 2017 
WL 4098688, at *8. Relatedly, the FTC argues that because 
AbbVie’s “oleic acid rationale does not explain the entire 
[October 2001] amendment,” the rationale for the amendment 
was not tangential to isopropyl palmitate as a matter of law. 
FTC Resp. Br. 39–40 (citing Felix v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 
562 F.3d 1167, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 2009) and Amgen Inc. v. 
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 
2006)). But negative claim limitations of the sort the Court 
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mentioned are usually impermissible. See In re Schechter, 205 
F.2d 185, 188 (C.C.P.A. 1953). Put differently, AbbVie and 
Besins probably could not have claimed all penetration 
enhancers “except oleic acid.” And the law is not as well-
settled as the FTC suggests. Granted, in the cases the FTC cites, 
the Federal Circuit held the tangentiality exception did not 
apply in part because the patentee’s rationale failed to explain 
the entire amendment. But because the Federal Circuit has 
refused to reduce the tangentiality exception to hard-and-fast 
rules, see Festo IX, 344 F.3d at 1368, a reasonable litigant in 
AbbVie and Besins’s position would not necessarily see those 
decisions as foreclosing its claim. 
 More persuasive is the District Court’s reasoning that 
the October 2001 amendment sought to overcome the Allen 
prior art, which “listed isopropyl palmitate as one of five 
penetration enhancers.” AbbVie, 2017 WL 4098688, at *8. The 
FTC also argues Allen’s disclosure of isopropyl palmitate 
“precludes a tangentiality finding,” because “an amendment 
made to avoid prior art that contains the equivalent in question 
is not tangential.” FTC Resp. Br. 38 (quoting Festo IX, 344 
F.3d at 1369 (Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., 
330 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003))). This argument is more 
persuasive because the rule the FTC cites is a well-settled 
exception to the Federal Circuit’s case-by-case approach to the 
tangentiality exception. See id. But the argument is not so 
strong as to make the suits objectively unreasonable. AbbVie 
and Besins could reasonably have argued the rule did not apply 
or should be modified, because even though Allen disclosed 
isopropyl palmitate, AbbVie and Besins made the October 
2001 amendment “to avoid” Mak’s use of oleic acid, not 
Allen’s disclosure of isopropyl palmitate or other penetration 
enhancers. PRE, 508 U.S. at 65 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11). 
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Thus, a reasonable litigant in AbbVie and Besins’s position 
would not necessarily see this rule as foreclosing its claim. 
 Finally, the District Court reasoned that the “entire 
prosecution history”—not just the October 2001 amendment—
is relevant to determine whether estoppel applies. AbbVie, 
2017 WL 4098688, at *6 (citing Wang Labs, Inc. v. Toshiba 
Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1993) and Tex. 
Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165, 
1174 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Likewise, the FTC argues that “[e]ven 
if the October 2001 amendment had not excluded isopropyl 
palmitate, the later amendments would have.” FTC Resp. Br. 
41. And those amendments “plainly could not have been 
intended to distinguish oleic acid, which (as AbbVie concedes) 
had already been excluded by the October 2001 amendment.” 
FTC Resp. Br. 42. Again, the law is not as well-settled as the 
FTC would have us believe. AbbVie and Besins could 
reasonably have argued only the October 2001 amendment was 
relevant under existing law. See Festo IX, 344 F.3d at 1369 
(tangentiality “focuses on the patentee’s objectively apparent 
reason for the narrowing amendment”) (emphasis added); see 
also Felix, 562 F.3d at 1182–83; PRE, 508 U.S. at 64–65 
(probable cause supports a claim if it is “arguably ‘warranted 
by existing law’”) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11). 
 Thus, the District Court erred in concluding AbbVie and 
Besins’s suit against Teva was objectively baseless. 
Accordingly, we will not consider the subjective motivation 
prong as to Teva. See PRE, 508 U.S. at 60–61. 
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c. The District Court did not err in concluding 
AbbVie and Besins’s suit against Perrigo was 
objectively baseless. 
 Perrigo’s first paragraph IV notice asserted that because 
its gel used the penetration enhancer isostearic acid instead of 
isopropyl myristate, the gel did not literally infringe the ’894 
patent. It also explained that the ’894 patent’s prosecution 
history estopped AbbVie and Besins from claiming 
infringement on the ground that isostearic acid is equivalent to 
isopropyl myristate.  
 AbbVie and Besins concede the December 2001 
amendment narrowed the patent application’s claims from 24 
penetration enhancers including isostearic acid to isopropyl 
myristate. But they argue it was not for a substantial reason 
relating to patentability and, if it was, the rationale for the 
amendment was tangential to isostearic acid. 
 No reasonable litigant in AbbVie and Besins’s position 
would believe it had a chance of winning on these arguments. 
First, AbbVie and Besins argue the December 2001 
amendment was not for a substantial reason relating to 
patentability, both because “the claims pending at the time of 
the December 2001 amendment . . . were never rejected or 
threatened with rejection,” and because they “amended the 
claims in December 2001 to expedite the timing of patent 
protection.” AbbVie Br. 47–48. This argument is untenable. 
“[A] voluntary amendment may give rise to prosecution 
history estoppel.” Festo IX, 344 F.3d at 1366 (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). And expediting prosecution is 
not a legitimate basis on which to avoid prosecution history 
estoppel. See Biogen, Inc. v. Berlex Labs., Inc., 318 F.3d 1132, 
1142 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[C]laims that were deliberately limited 
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in order to expedite prosecution by avoiding examination 
cannot regain that scope for infringement purposes.”) (citing 
Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1564 
(Fed. Cir. 1994)). Regardless, no court would hold the 
December 2001 amendment’s purpose was to expedite 
prosecution. “[A] patentee’s rebuttal of the Warner–Jenkinson 
presumption” that a narrowing amendment was made for a 
substantial reason relating to patentability “is restricted to the 
evidence in the prosecution history record.” Festo IX, 344 at 
1367 (citations omitted). But nothing in the prosecution history 
supports AbbVie and Besins’s claim that the December 2001 
amendment’s purpose was to expedite prosecution. AbbVie 
and Besins cite the amendment’s concluding sentence, which 
reads: “The Examiner is urged to call the undersigned with any 
questions or to otherwise expedite prosecution.” App. 1095 
(emphasis added). But that boilerplate statement reveals 
nothing about the amendment’s purpose. AbbVie and Besins 
also argue that even if the purpose to expedite prosecution did 
not appear in the prosecution history, it was clear “as a matter 
of law.” Abbvie Br. 48 n.3. This argument fails even as an 
argument “for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law.” PRE, 508 U.S. at 65 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11). 
As we have explained, the rule that a patentee’s rebuttal of the 
Warner-Jenkinson presumption is restricted to the prosecution 
history is fundamental; it balances “the needs of patentees for 
adequate protection of their inventions” on the one hand, and 
“the needs of would-be competitors for adequate notice of the 
scope of that protection” on the other. Festo IX, 344 F.3d at 
1385 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 To the extent the prosecution history reveals the 
December 2001 amendment’s purpose, it shows the 
amendment related to patentability. In June 2001, the patent 
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examiner rejected the application’s claim 1. In October 2001, 
AbbVie and Besins unsuccessfully tried to overcome the 
rejection by amending the application. Their attorneys then had 
an interview with the patent examiner in which she opined that 
the application’s claims to isopropyl myristate were allowable 
over the prior art. As the District Court found, these facts were 
“a telling signal to any reasonable person that patentability 
required the narrowing of any claim so that it disclosed 
isopropyl myristate at a particular concentration as the sole 
penetration enhancer.” AbbVie, 2017 WL 4098688, at *11. 
AbbVie and Besins followed that signal in their December 
2001 amendment: in the amendment’s conclusion—
immediately before the boilerplate discussed above—they 
sought “reconsideration and withdrawal of the outstanding 
rejections and allowance of the . . . claims.” App. 1095. 
(emphasis added). 
 AbbVie and Besins also argue the rationale for the 
December 2001 amendment was to overcome Mak’s use of 
oleic acid, so it was tangential to isostearic acid. That argument 
contradicts the prosecution history. AbbVie and Besins 
narrowed their claims to exclude oleic acid in October 2001, 
so that could not have been the purpose of the December 2001 
amendment. 
 AbbVie and Besins counter that the District Court erred 
by “assessing . . . whether [they] had a winning case against 
Perrigo” instead of whether a reasonable litigant would believe 
it had a chance of winning. AbbVie Br. 50. We disagree. While 
the Court did assess whether they had a winning case, it also 
assessed whether a reasonable litigant would believe it had a 
chance of winning. See AbbVie, 2017 WL 4098688, at *9 
(“[A]ny reasonable person who reads the prosecution history 
of the ’894 patent can reach no other conclusion than that the 
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defendants have purposefully and not tangentially 
excluded . . . isostearic acid.”). 
 Finally, AbbVie and Besins argue “[t]he favorable 
settlements [they] obtained in both suits foreclose the 
proposition that no reasonable person could have perceived a 
chance of success for the infringement claims.” AbbVie Br. 
50–51. They note Perrigo agreed to “continued market 
exclusivity for AndroGel until late 2014—‘far beyond the 
maximum 30-month Hatch-Waxman stay[]’ that would have 
applied had the lawsuits continued.” Id. at 51. We think that, 
ordinarily, settlement on terms favorable to a plaintiff suggests 
a suit is not objectively baseless. See, e.g., Theme Promotions, 
Inc. v. News Am. Mktg. FSI, 546 F.3d 991, 1008 (9th Cir. 
2008); New W., L.P. v. City of Joliet, 491 F.3d 717, 722 (7th 
Cir. 2007). But that is not the situation here. To start, the 
settlement with Perrigo was not especially favorable to AbbVie 
and Besins. AbbVie paid Perrigo $2 million as reasonable 
litigation expenses and agreed to let Perrigo enter the market 
for AndroGel at the same time as Teva—almost six years 
before the ’894 patent expired. Even if the settlement was 
favorable, however, that is not dispositive, since the record is 
clear that Perrigo did not settle because it doubted its litigation 
position. In Perrigo’s paragraph IV notice, it opined that “a 
lawsuit asserting the ’894 patent . . . would be objectively 
baseless and a sham, brought in bad faith for the improper 
purpose of, inter alia, delaying Perrigo’s NDA approval.” 
AbbVie, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 114. And Perrigo’s assistant general 
counsel estimated it had a 75 percent chance of victory, which, 
given the uncertainties inherent in litigation, is a strong 
probability. Thus, as the District Court found, Perrigo settled 
for reasons “independent of the merits of [AbbVie and 
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Besins’s] claims,” including especially the cost of litigating. 
Id. at 123. 
 Thus, the District Court did not err in concluding 
AbbVie and Besins’s suit against Perrigo was objectively 
baseless. 
3. The District Court did not err in concluding AbbVie 
and Besins’s suit against Perrigo met sham litigation’s 
subjective motivation prong. 
 The District Court’s evaluation of the subjective 
motivation prong of the sham litigation test required it to make 
findings of fact. We review those factual findings under the 
deferential clear-error standard. See VICI Racing, LLC v. T-
Mobile USA, Inc., 763 F.3d 273, 282–83 (3d Cir. 2014). A 
finding is clearly erroneous when “although there is evidence 
to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 
395 (1948). “Where there are two permissible views of the 
evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be 
clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 
470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (citations omitted). Clear error 
review exists to prevent a reviewing court from 
“overstep[ping] the bounds of its duty . . . [by] duplicat[ing] 
the role of the lower court.” Id. at 573 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 
52(a)). 
 The District Court ruled the FTC “must prove [by clear 
and convincing evidence] that defendants had actual 
knowledge that the patent infringement suits here were 
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baseless.” AbbVie, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 120.3 In support, it cited 
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 
365 (1991), in which the Supreme Court said “[a] classic 
example [of sham litigation] is the filing of frivolous objections 
to the license application of a competitor, with no expectation 
of achieving denial of the license but simply in order to impose 
expense and delay.” Id. at 380 (emphasis added).  
 The District Court then determined certain evidence 
submitted to show AbbVie and Besins’s knowledge was not 
probative. This evidence included: (1) Solvay’s 2009 press 
release, because “[n]one of the in-house AbbVie attorneys 
identified as the decision-makers regarding the 2011 suit[] 
against . . . Perrigo was previously employed by Solvay or 
Unimed,” AbbVie, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 121; (2) business 
planning documents, because “none of the[] 
documents . . . was created by or influenced anyone who 
played a role in the decision[] to sue . . . Perrigo,” id. at 122; 
 
 3 In a footnote in its response brief, the FTC challenges 
the District Court’s requirement of proof by clear-and-
convincing evidence. We have not decided what standard of 
proof applies to sham litigation’s subjective motivation prong. 
Cf. Wellbutrin, 868 F.3d at 148 n.18 (referencing the objective 
baselessness prong). But in discussing Noerr-Pennington cases 
involving Section 1983 claims, we have explained that a higher 
standard of proof is needed in Noerr-Pennington cases 
involving patent disputes. See Campbell v. Pa. Sch. Bd. Ass’n, 
2020 WL 5049051, at *7 (3d Cir. 2020). We need not adopt that 
dicta today because “arguments raised in passing (such as, in a 
footnote), but not squarely argued,” are forfeited on appeal. 
John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Intern. Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 
1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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(3) the settlement agreements, because “[p]arties often settle 
litigation for a variety of reasons independent of the merits of 
the claims,” id. at 123; and (4) AbbVie’s citizen petitions, 
because the petitions “were [all] found to be at least partially 
meritorious,” id.4 
 Finally, the Court “zoom[ed] in on the individuals at 
AbbVie and Besins who made the decision[] to file the 
infringement action[] against . . . Perrigo [to] discern what 
these individuals knew.” Id. at 123–24. Because AbbVie and 
Besins invoked attorney-client privilege and the attorney work 
product doctrine, the trial produced “no direct evidence of 
[these individuals’] subjective intent.” Id. at 125. The Court 
refused to draw any negative inference as a result. See id. 
Instead, it considered “the surrounding circumstances and the 
natural and probable consequences of [AbbVie and Besins’s] 
knowing acts.” Id. The Court considered two pieces of 
circumstantial evidence. First, because AbbVie and Besins’s 
decisionmakers were all “very experienced patent attorneys” 
who had reviewed Perrigo’s paragraph IV notices and 
consulted outside counsel, they knew the lawsuit against 
Perrigo was objectively baseless. Id. at 126. And second, the 
decisionmakers—some of whom were long-time employees—
“knew the extensive financial benefits to [AbbVie and Besins] 
if generic versions of AndroGel were kept or delayed from 
entry into the market.” Id. The Court concluded “[t]he only 
 
 4 AbbVie and Besins argue the District Court erred by 
not considering the business planning documents and 
settlement agreements. The FTC argues the Court erred by not 
considering Solvay’s 2009 press release. The Court correctly 
concluded that none of this evidence is probative of the 
decisionmakers’ subjective motivations. 
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reason for the filing of these lawsuits was to impose expense 
and delay on . . . Perrigo so as to block [its] entry into the 
TTRT market.” Id. 
 AbbVie and Besins argue the District Court erred by 
merging sham litigation’s objective baselessness and 
subjective motivation prongs. They claim “the relevant inquiry 
under the subjective element [is] whether [the] decisionmakers 
actually believed the lawsuits had no possibility of success” 
and were therefore “subjective[ly] baseless[].” AbbVie Br. 56.  
 The FTC counters that the District Court required it to 
prove more than was necessary, because the subjective inquiry 
“has nothing to do with what a litigant knew or should have 
known regarding the merits of its claims.” FTC Resp. Br. 57 
(quoting Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., 738 F.3d 1302, 
1313 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). Instead, the FTC argues, what matters 
is the intent to “thwart competition.” Id. (citing Octane Fitness, 
572 U.S. at 556). 
 We agree with the FTC that the District Court applied 
an improper legal standard. The ultimate inquiry under sham 
litigation’s subjective prong is a defendant’s subjective 
motivation, not its subjective belief about the merits of its 
claims. See PRE, 508 U.S. at 60–61; Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. 
at 556. Thus, the term “subjective baselessness” is a misnomer. 
That said, we disagree that the inquiry into a defendant’s 
motivation has “nothing to do” with a defendant’s belief about 
the merits of its claims. But cf. Kilopass, 738 F.3d at 1313. 
Evidence that a defendant knew its claims were meritless may 
help a plaintiff to show a defendant was “indifferent to the 
outcome on the merits of the . . . suit” and “decided to sue 
primarily for the benefit of collateral injuries inflicted through 
the use of legal process.” PRE, 508 U.S. at 65 (citation 
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omitted). It is therefore unsurprising that evidence of a 
defendant’s belief about the merits of its claims appears in a 
“classic example” of sham litigation, Omni, 499 U.S. at 380, or 
that it appeared in this case. So while evidence of a defendant’s 
belief about the merits of its claims may be relevant to 
determining a defendant’s motivation, it is not required in 
every case. In short, a defendant can be ambivalent about the 
merits while filing litigation for an improper purpose (i.e., in 
bad faith). 
 We also reject AbbVie and Besins’s argument that the 
District Court improperly merged sham litigation’s objective 
baselessness and subjective motivation prongs. That argument 
assumes the two prongs are distinct, but they are interrelated. 
To see how, consider the following syllogism: (1) A lawsuit is 
objectively baseless if “no reasonable litigant could 
realistically expect success on the merits,” PRE, 508 U.S. at 
60; (2) and a litigant who files an objectively baseless lawsuit 
must have had some subjective motivation for suing; (3) but 
because the lawsuit was objectively baseless, the litigant’s 
subjective motivation could not have been success on the 
merits, unless the litigant was unreasonable; (4) thus, a 
reasonable litigant’s subjective motivation for filing an 
objectively baseless lawsuit must be something besides success 
on the merits. The District Court merely applied this syllogism. 
It first held that AbbVie and Besins’s lawsuits were objectively 
baseless. It then reasoned that because AbbVie and Besins’s 
decisionmakers were all very experienced patent attorneys who 
had reviewed Perrigo’s paragraph IV notices and consulted 
outside counsel, they knew the lawsuits were baseless. Finally, 
it reasoned that because the decisionmakers knew the lawsuits 
were baseless, they must have been motivated by something 
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other than success on the merits. The District Court’s logic is 
valid. 
 AbbVie and Besins respond that, under the District 
Court’s analysis, “in virtually every Hatch-Waxman suit in 
which a court finds objective baselessness, a finding of 
subjective baselessness would necessarily follow.” AbbVie Br. 
57. Not so. The syllogism the Court applied establishes only 
that a reasonable litigant’s subjective motivation must have 
been something besides success on the merits. It does not 
necessarily follow that the motivation was to thwart 
competition. For example, a company might file an objectively 
baseless lawsuit because it subjectively (though unreasonably) 
expected the lawsuit to succeed. In that case, a finding of 
“subjective baselessness” would not necessarily follow from a 
finding of objective baselessness.  
 AbbVie and Besins next argue that the circumstantial 
evidence the Court considered was insufficient to establish the 
subjective motivation prong by clear and convincing evidence, 
especially given the presumption that “the assertion of a duly 
granted patent is made in good faith.” AbbVie Br. 56 (quoting 
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 
1998)). 
 We disagree. Because AbbVie and Besins invoked 
attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product 
doctrine, the Court properly considered the surrounding 
circumstances and the natural and probable consequences of 
AbbVie and Besins’s intentional acts to make its findings. Cf. 
Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 602 
F.3d 237, 257–58 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Specific intent in the 
antitrust context may be inferred from a defendant’s unlawful 
conduct.”) (citing Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 
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F.3d 1191, 1199 (3d Cir. 1995)). The Court noted that AbbVie 
and Besins’s decisionmakers were all experienced patent 
attorneys who had reviewed Perrigo’s paragraph IV notices 
and consulted outside counsel. They also knew the extensive 
financial benefits AbbVie and Besins would receive if generic 
versions of AndroGel were kept or delayed from entry into the 
market. Especially given the collateral injury the Hatch-
Waxman Act’s 30-month stay invariably inflicts, the Court was 
permitted to conclude from this evidence that in filing an 
objectively baseless lawsuit against Perrigo, the 
decisionmakers were motivated not to assert a patent in good 
faith, but to impose expense and delay on Perrigo to delay its 
entry into the TTRT market. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574. 
 Besins lastly argues the District Court clearly erred 
because the FTC presented “no evidence” about “who in 2011 
were the decisionmakers at Besins . . . and what those people 
knew.” Besins Br. 14. It also argues the trial testimony “neither 
addressed nor established who made the 2011 decisions to sue. 
Nor did the FTC ask [Besin’s in-house counsel] MacAllister 
who at Besins made those decisions.” Id. at 15. 
 The District Court did not clearly err. MacAllister 
testified at trial that: he is a former patent examiner; he was 
“the highest ranking attorney in-house at Besins,” App. 3672; 
he “oversaw the global intellectual property group,” id.; and he 
“advised on litigations concerning Besins’[s] patents,” App. 
3673. An attorney for the FTC asked MacAllister whether he 
was “involved in the decision to file patent litigation against 
Perrigo in 2011.” App. 3690. He responded that he conferred 
with AbbVie’s in-house counsel “related to the decision 
whether or not to proceed with the lawsuit,” and that Besins’s 
outside counsel provided him and others with advice that 
“informed our decision as to whether or not to proceed with the 
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lawsuit.” Id. It was “permissible” for the Court to conclude 
from this testimony that MacAllister decided to sue on Besins’s 
behalf. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574. 
 Thus, the District Court did not err in concluding 
AbbVie and Besins’s suit against Perrigo concealed an attempt 
to interfere directly with its business relationships, through the 
use of the governmental process—as opposed to the 
outcome of that process—as an anticompetitive weapon. 
C. The District Court did not err in concluding 
AbbVie and Besins had monopoly power in the 
relevant market. 
 To prove monopolization, a plaintiff must establish that 
the defendant had monopoly power in the relevant market. See 
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 306–07 (3d 
Cir. 2007). Monopoly power is “the ability to control prices 
and exclude competition in a given market.” Id. 
 The FTC relied on indirect evidence to establish 
AbbVie’s monopoly power. “To support a claim of monopoly 
power through indirect evidence, [a plaintiff] must show that 
(1) [d]efendants had market power in the relevant market and 
(2) that there were barriers to entry into the market.” Mylan, 
838 F.3d at 435. Market power is “the ability to raise prices 
above those that would otherwise prevail in a competitive 
market.” Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 210 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). A court can infer market power 
from a market share significantly greater than 55 percent. See 
Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 187. “Other germane factors include the 
size and strength of competing firms, freedom of entry, pricing 
trends and practices in the industry, ability of consumers to 
substitute comparable goods, and consumer demand.” Id. A 
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defendant’s ability to maintain market share is also relevant. 
See id. at 188–89 (citing United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 
F.2d 659, 665–66 (9th Cir. 1990)). Barriers to entry include 
“regulatory requirements, high capital costs, or technological 
obstacles, that prevent new competition from entering a market 
in response to a monopolist’s supracompetitive prices.” 
Broadcom Corp., 501 F.3d at 307. 
 The parties agreed that the relevant geographic market 
is the United States, so the District Court had to define only the 
product market.  
To determine if two products are in the same 
market, we ask if they are readily substitutable 
for one another, an inquiry that requires us to 
assess the reasonable interchangeability of use 
between a product and its substitute. We also 
look to their cross-elasticity of demand, which is 
defined as a relationship between two products, 
usually substitutes for each other, in which a 
price change for one product affects the price of 
the other.  
Mylan, 838 F.3d at 435–36 (internal quotation marks, citations, 
and alterations omitted); see also SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly 
& Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1064 (3d Cir. 1978) (requiring 
“significant” cross-elasticity of demand).  
 The District Court defined the product market as “the 
market for all TTRTs, that is all transdermal testosterone 
replacement therapies within the United States.” AbbVie, 329 
F. Supp. 3d at 134. It found that all TTRTs were “reasonably 
interchangeable” and exhibited cross-elasticity of demand. See 
id. at 131–32. By contrast, in considering the market for 
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TTRTs and injectables, the Court found that while TTRTs 
were reasonably interchangeable with injectables, they 
exhibited “little cross-elasticity of demand.” Id. at 133. It relied 
on the following evidence: 
• Injectables are much cheaper than AndroGel, yet 
AbbVie has “consistently raised AndroGel’s wholesale 
acquisition cost.” 
• AbbVie executive James Hynd testified that AbbVie 
does not price AndroGel against injectables and did not 
offer rebates to match the price of injectables. 
• AndroGel’s Director of Marketing Frank Jaeger 
testified that AbbVie did not consider injectables to be 
competition. He identified other TTRTs “such as 
Axiron, Fortesta, and Testim as AndroGel’s 
competitors.” 
Id. The Court discounted an internal AbbVie document stating 
that a rise in AndroGel’s copay was correlated with an increase 
in injectables’ sales. It explained that factors besides price 
drove the correlation, including “patient preference, the 
existence of [specialized testosterone clinics], and the 
disproportionate negative publicity testosterone gels received 
after reports associating TTRTs with heightened 
cardiovascular risk.” Id. For the same reason, the Court also 
discounted a “patient switching study” that AbbVie and 
Besins’s expert conducted. See id.  
 The District Court also found that AbbVie and Besins 
had “a dominant share of the TTRT market in the relevant 
period and that significant barriers existed for entry into that 
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market.” Id. at 136. It relied on the following evidence in 
finding that AbbVie and Besins had a dominant share: 
• “In the TTRT market, AndroGel was by far the most-
prescribed product and was widely-recognized as the 
‘market leader’ from before 2011 through 2014.” 
• In April 2011 (when AbbVie and Besins sued Teva), 
AndroGel’s share of the TTRT market was 71.5 
percent. In October 2011 (when they sued Perrigo), 
AndroGel’s share was 63.6 percent. AndroGel’s share 
“remained above 60[ percent] until the end of 2014, 
when Perrigo’s generic 1% testosterone product entered 
the market.” 
• No other TTRT product ever held 10 percent or more of 
the market during this period, and AndroGel’s market 
share was always more than three times larger than the 
market share of any of its brand-name competitors. 
• “AbbVie was able to maintain its share of the TTRT 
market with a profit margin of over 65[ percent]” during 
this period, “even with huge rebates.” 
• AbbVie increased the wholesale acquisition cost for 
AndroGel during this period. 
Id. at 134–35. Finally, the Court found significant barriers to 
entry because “a generic drug has significant capital, technical, 
regulatory, and legal barriers to overcome.” Id. at 135–36. It 
explained that, although three brand-name TTRT products 
(i.e., Fortesta, Axiron, and Vogelxo) entered the market 
between 2011 and 2014, “they did not pose significant 
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competition to [AbbVie and Besins’s] monopolistic conduct” 
because they held a low market share. Id. at 136. 
 AbbVie and Besins claim the District Court clearly 
erred by excluding injectables from the product market for two 
reasons. First, the record contained “voluminous evidence, 
including expert testimony, showing substantial cross-
elasticity between topical TRTs and injectables.” AbbVie Br. 
64. And second, the FTC’s expert conceded “some cross-
elasticity . . . between AndroGel and injectables” and 
“presented no cross-elasticity study to support” the market the 
Court defined. Id. at 64–65 (citation omitted). In sum, AbbVie 
and Besins argue that the Court “defined the relevant antitrust 
market in terms no expert had endorsed.” Id. at 29.  
 We disagree for several reasons. First, the mere fact that 
the record contained evidence tending to show substantial 
cross-elasticity between topical TRTs and injectables does not 
mean the Court clearly erred. AbbVie employees conceded at 
trial that AndroGel does not compete against injectables, so it 
was at least “permissible” for the Court to exclude injectables 
from the product market. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574. Second, 
while the FTC’s expert conceded some cross-elasticity 
between AndroGel and injectables, he did not concede 
significant cross-elasticity, which is required to find clear 
error. See SmithKline Corp., 575 F.2d at 1064. Finally, the 
FTC’s expert did study whether AndroGel and injectables 
exhibited cross-elasticity of demand. App. 3862 (“I looked at 
the data on what happened over time to a number of injectable 
prescriptions and looked to see whether significant changes in 
the price of the transdermal products, whether we could see an 
effect on injectables . . . [The data] indicates a low cross-
elasticity of demand between AndroGel and injectables . . . .”). 
While the expert did not “endorse” the market the Court 
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ultimately defined, his testimony supported the Court’s market 
definition, and the FTC argued for that definition in the 
alternative. App. 3491 (“[E]ven if the relevant market included 
all other TRT products except injections, the market share has 
established that AndroGel still possessed monopoly power.”).  
 AbbVie and Besins also contend the District Court 
committed legal error by misapplying the legal standard as to 
the existence of market power and barriers to entry. They argue 
the Court gave dispositive weight to market share data and 
Hatch-Waxman’s technical and regulatory requirements while 
ignoring real-world evidence. They emphasize that three new 
competing brand-name TTRTs entered the market between 
2011 and 2014. We are unpersuaded. 
 The Court did not give dispositive weight to market 
share data; it also considered consumer demand for AndroGel, 
the durability of AndroGel’s market share, the size and 
strength of AndroGel’s competitors, and AndroGel’s pricing 
trends and practices. See Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 187–89 
(explaining these are relevant factors). And the Court did not 
ignore new entrants; it explained the three brand-name TTRT 
products that entered the market between 2011 and 2014 were 
not meaningful competitors to AndroGel because of their 
modest market shares. So the District Court did not err in 
concluding AbbVie and Besins had monopoly power in the 
relevant market. 
 For all the reasons stated, we hold the District Court 
erred by rejecting the reverse-payment theory and in 
concluding AbbVie and Besins’s litigation against Teva was a 
sham. We also hold that the Court did not err when it concluded 
the Perrigo litigation was a sham and that AbbVie and Besins 




 We turn finally to remedial issues. The District Court 
erred in requiring AbbVie and Besins to disgorge $448 million 
because district courts lack the power to order disgorgement 
under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act. But it did not abuse its 
discretion in denying injunctive relief. Nor is it futile to remand 
the reverse-payment theory. 
A. The District Court erred in ordering disgorgement. 
 The District Court ordered AbbVie and Besins to 
disgorge $448 million in ill-gotten profits. It reasoned “[t]he 
weight of authority . . . supports the conclusion that the grant 
of authority in section 13(b) to provide injunctive relief 
includes the full range of equitable remedies, including the 
power to order a defendant to disgorge illegally obtained 
funds.” AbbVie, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 137 (citation omitted). It 
also said a contrary interpretation would “eviscerate the FTC 
Act” because a monopolist would “be able to retain its ill-
gotten gains and simply face an injunction against future 
wrongdoing.” Id.  
 Reviewing the District Court’s interpretation de novo, 
see Kaufman v. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144, 151 (3d 
Cir. 2009), we conclude it erred in ordering disgorgement 
because district courts lack the power to do so under Section 
13(b). 
 “The FTC has multiple instruments in its toolbox to 
combat unfair methods of competition” and unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices. FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 
155 (3d Cir. 2019). First is the FTC’s “traditional enforcement 
tool,” Section 5 of the FTC Act. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)). 
84 
 
That section allows the FTC to initiate an administrative 
proceeding to obtain a cease-and-desist order against an unfair 
method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). The FTC can then sue in federal district 
court to get “limited monetary remedies” for violations of the 
order. Shire, 917 F.3d at 155. A respondent who violates an 
order is liable for no more than $10,000 per violation. See 15 
U.S.C. § 45(l). The FTC can also seek “mandatory injunctions” 
and “such other and further equitable relief” as the court deems 
appropriate. Id. Violators other than the respondent are also 
liable for up to $10,000 per violation, but only if they violate 
the order knowingly. See id. § 45(m)(1)(A).  
 Second, under Section 19 of the FTC Act, the FTC can 
promulgate “rules which define with specificity acts or 
practices which are unfair or deceptive.” Id. § 57a(a)(1)(B). 
Alternatively, it can initiate an administrative proceeding to 
obtain a cease-and-desist order. Id. § 57a(a)(2). In either case, 
it can sue violators in federal district court. See id. § 57a(a)(1)–
(2). If the FTC promulgated a rule, the court can “grant such 
relief as the court finds necessary to redress injury,” including 
but not limited to “the refund of money or return of property” 
and “the payment of damages.” Id. § 57b(b). Otherwise, the 
FTC can obtain such relief only if it shows “a reasonable man 
would have known under the circumstances” his conduct was 
“dishonest or fraudulent.” Id. § 57b(a)(2).  
 A third enforcement tool is Section 13(b) of the FTC 
Act. “Unlike Section 5, Section 13 was not part of the original 
FTC Act.” Shire, 917 F.3d at 155. “Rather, [it] was added later 
[in 1973] in an effort to solve one of the main problems of the 
FTC’s relatively slow-moving administrative regime—the 




 The question presented in this appeal is whether a 
district court has the power to order disgorgement under 
Section 13(b). We start with the text, for where “the words of 
the statute are unambiguous, the judicial inquiry is complete.” 
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 91 (2003) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). Section 13(b) states: 
Whenever the Commission has reason to 
believe— 
(1) that any person, partnership, or corporation is 
violating, or is about to violate, any provision of 
law enforced by the Federal Trade Commission, 
and  
(2) that the enjoining thereof pending the 
issuance of a complaint by the Commission and 
until such complaint is dismissed by the 
Commission or set aside by the court on review, 
or until the order of the Commission made 
thereon has become final, would be in the 
interest of the public— 
the Commission by any of its attorneys 
designated by it for such purpose may bring suit 
in a district court of the United States to enjoin 
any such act or practice. Upon a proper showing 
that, weighing the equities and considering the 
Commission’s likelihood of ultimate success, 
such action would be in the public interest, and 
after notice to the defendant, a temporary 
restraining order or a preliminary injunction may 
be granted without bond: Provided, however, 
That if a complaint is not filed within such period 
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(not exceeding 20 days) as may be specified by 
the court after issuance of the temporary 
restraining order or preliminary injunction, the 
order or injunction shall be dissolved by the 
court and be of no further force and effect: 
Provided further, That in proper cases the 
Commission may seek, and after proper proof, 
the court may issue, a permanent injunction. 
15 U.S.C. § 53(b). Section 13(b) authorizes a court to “enjoin” 
antitrust violations. It says nothing about disgorgement, which 
is a form of restitution, see Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1940–
41 (2020), not injunctive relief, see, e.g., Meghrig v. KFC W., 
Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 484 (1996) (“[N]either [a mandatory nor 
prohibitory injunction] contemplates the award 
of . . . ‘damages’ or ‘equitable restitution.’”); Owner-Operator 
Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Landstar Sys., Inc., 622 F.3d 1307, 
1324 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Injunctive relief constitutes a distinct 
type of equitable relief; it is not an umbrella term that 
encompasses restitution or disgorgement.”). Thus, Section 
13(b) does not explicitly empower district courts to order 
disgorgement. 
 This interpretation is even stronger in context. Section 
13(b) says that, in order to sue, the FTC must have reason to 
believe an antitrust violation is imminent or ongoing. See 
Shire, 917 F.3d at 156 (holding requirement applies to request 
for permanent injunction). This requirement makes perfect 
sense as applied to injunctive relief, which prevents or 
mandates a future action. See Injunction, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (rev. 4th ed. 1968). So if a violator’s conduct is 
neither imminent nor ongoing, there is nothing to enjoin, and 
the FTC cannot sue under Section 13(b). By contrast, the 
requirement makes little sense as applied to a disgorgement 
87 
 
remedy. Disgorgement deprives a wrongdoer of past gains, see 
Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1940–41, meaning that even if a wrongdoer’s 
conduct is not imminent or ongoing, he may have gains to 
disgorge. If Congress contemplated the FTC could sue for 
disgorgement under Section 13(b), it probably would not have 
required the FTC to show an imminent or ongoing violation. 
That requirement suggests Section 13(b) does not empower 
district courts to order disgorgement. 
 The FTC’s other enforcement powers also support our 
interpretation. Both distinguish between injunctions and other 
forms of equitable relief. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (FTC can seek 
“mandatory injunctions” and “such other and further equitable 
relief” as the court deems appropriate); Id. § 57b(b) (court can 
“grant such relief as the court finds necessary to redress 
injury,” including but not limited to “the refund of money or 
return of property” and “the payment of damages”). The timing 
of the enactment of these powers is also instructive. Congress 
amended Section 5 to allow “such other and further equitable 
relief” at the same time it enacted Section 13(b). See Trans-
Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408, 
87 Stat. 576, 591 (1973). And it enacted Section 19—which 
allows disgorgement only under certain conditions—after 
Section 13(b). See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, Pub. L. No. 
93-637, § 206, 88 Stat. 2183, 2201–02 (1975). Thus, Sections 
5 and 19 both show that when Congress wants to empower a 
district court to order more expansive equitable relief than 
injunctions, it does so. Yet Congress did not do so in Section 
13(b). 
 A contrary conclusion would undermine the FTC Act’s 
statutory scheme. Section 13(b) was added in 1973 because the 
FTC’s administrative regime moved slowly. See Shire, 917 
F.3d at 155. But it is slow-moving for a reason: it affords 
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defendants valuable procedural protections. For example, 
Section 5 conditions relief to defendants on an administrative 
proceeding and a cease-and-desist order. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(b). It also limits the monetary relief the FTC can obtain. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(l); see also id. § 45(m)(1)(A). Section 19 
likewise requires the FTC to promulgate “rules which define 
with specificity acts or practices which are unfair,” or initiate 
an administrative proceeding to obtain a cease-and-desist 
order. Id. § 57a(a)(1)(B)–(2). By contrast, Section 13(b) does 
not incorporate these same protections: it grants the FTC a 
cause of action to seek a preliminary  injunction in federal court 
without first pursuing administrative adjudication or 
rulemaking; and it imposes no limits on the amount of any 
monetary relief the FTC may be able to obtain. Thus, our 
interpretation does not “eviscerate” the FTC Act; it harmonizes 
its provisions. 
 The FTC counters that Section 19 has a savings clause. 
That clause states: “Remedies provided in this section are in 
addition to, and not in lieu of, any other remedy or right of 
action provided by State or Federal law. Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to affect any authority of the Commission 
under any other provision of law.” 15 U.S.C. § 57b(e). But 
“[t]he saving clause preserves only those remedies that exist. It 
does not inform the question whether section 13(b) contains an 
implied power to award restitution.” FTC v. Credit Bureau 
Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d 764, 775 (7th Cir. 2019). 
 The FTC argues the interpretation we adopt goes 
against the weight of precedent. It notes that seven of our sister 
courts have held courts may order disgorgement under Section 
13(b), and we acknowledged as much in the footnote of a not-
precedential decision. FTC Reply Br. 88 (quoting FTC v. 
Magazine Sols., LLC, 432 F. App’x 155, 158 n.2 (3d Cir. 
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2011)). That is true, but until recently, “[n]o circuit ha[d] 
examined whether reading a restitution remedy into section 
13(b) comports with the FTCA’s text and structure.” Credit 
Bureau, 937 F.3d at 785 (describing the precedents); see also 
id. (quoting United States v. Hill, 48 F.3d 228, 232 (7th Cir. 
1995) (“We are not merely to count noses. The parties are 
entitled to our independent judgment.”)). Moreover, today’s 
result is consistent with the recent ruling of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which, in a thorough 
and well-reasoned opinion, overturned its precedent 
authorizing restitution under Section 13(b). Credit Bureau 
Center, 937 F.3d at 764; see also FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., 
LLC, 910 F.3d 417, 429 (9th Cir. 2018) (O’Scannlain, J., 
specially concurring). Finally, our decision in Magazine 
Solutions does not bind us. See I.O.P. 5.7. Even if it did, the 
part of the footnote on which the FTC relies was dictum 
because the litigant forfeited the issue by failing to raise it in 
the district court. See 432 F. App’x at 158 n.2. 
 Next, the FTC argues Congress has “twice ratified the 
consistent understanding of the courts of appeals”—first in 
1994, when Congress expanded the venue and service-of-
process provisions of Section 13(b), see FTC Act Amendments 
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, § 10, 108 Stat. 1691, 1695–96 
(1994); and second in 2006, when Congress made “[a]ll 
remedies available to the Commission . . . including restitution 
to domestic or foreign victims” available for certain unfair 
practices abroad, see U.S. Safe Web Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-455, § 3, 120 Stat. 3372, 3372 (2006) (amending 15 
U.S.C. § 45(a)(4)(B)) (emphasis added). FTC Reply Br. 93. 
We disagree. The 1994 amendment did not change the 
remedies available to the Commission. So it can hardly be seen 
as ratifying our sister courts’ precedents on that issue. And the 
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2006 amendment’s reference to restitution does not mean 
restitution is available under Section 13(b); the availability of 
restitution under Sections 5 and 19 is well-settled, and the 
amendment could have referred to those sections instead. 
 The crux of the FTC’s counterargument is a pair of 
Supreme Court decisions on which our sister courts and the 
District Court relied—Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 
395, 398 (1946), and Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 
361 U.S. 288 (1960). According to the FTC, these decisions 
mean Section 13(b)’s use of the word “injunction” impliedly 
empowers district courts to order equitable relief in addition to 
injunctions. Once again, we disagree. 
 In Porter, the Supreme Court held a district court could 
order restitution under the Emergency Price Control Act of 
1942, which authorized the Administrator of the Office of 
Price Administration to seek “a permanent or temporary 
injunction, restraining order, or other order” in court. 328 U.S. 
at 397 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned:  
Unless otherwise provided by statute, all the 
inherent equitable powers of the District Court 
are available for the proper and complete 
exercise of that jurisdiction. And since the public 
interest is involved . . . , those equitable powers 
assume an even broader and more flexible 
character than when only a private controversy is 
at stake. Power is thereby resident in the District 
Court, in exercising this jurisdiction to do equity 
and to mould each decree to the necessities of the 
particular case. It may act so as . . . to accord full 
justice to all the real parties in interest . . . . In 
addition, the court may . . . give whatever other 
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relief may be necessary under the circumstances. 
Only in that way can equity do complete rather 
than truncated justice. 
 Moreover, the comprehensiveness of this 
equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or 
limited in the absence of a clear and valid 
legislative command. Unless a statute in so many 
words, or by a necessary and inescapable 
inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in 
equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be 
recognized and applied. 
Id. at 398 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Court 
concluded that “the term ‘other order’ contemplates a remedy 
other than that of an injunction or restraining order, a remedy 
entered in the exercise of the District Court’s equitable 
discretion.” Id. at 399. It noted that no “other provision of the 
Act . . . expressly or impliedly precludes a court from ordering 
restitution.” Id. at 403. 
 In Mitchell, the Supreme Court extended Porter. The 
Court held a district court could order wage reimbursement 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, which gave courts 
jurisdiction “to restrain violations” of the Act. Mitchell, 361 
U.S. at 289. The Court said: 
When Congress entrusts to an equity court the 
enforcement of prohibitions contained in a 
regulatory enactment, it must be taken to have 
acted cognizant of the historic power of equity to 
provide complete relief in light of the statutory 
purposes. As this Court long ago recognized, 
there is inherent in the Courts of Equity a 
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jurisdiction to . . . give effect to the policy of the 
legislature. 
Id. at 291–92 (alteration in original) (citation and internal 
quotations omitted). It was immaterial that the Act lacked 
language, like “other order” in Porter, that confirmed the 
court’s power to order reimbursement. See id. at 291 (citations 
omitted). 
 We interpreted Porter and Mitchell in United States v. 
Lane Labs-USA Inc., 427 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2005). There, we 
held a court could order restitution under the FDC Act in part 
because the Act empowered district courts to “restrain 
violations.” See id. at 223; 21 U.S.C. § 332(a). We explained 
Porter and Mitchell “charted an analytical course that seems 
fairly easy to follow: (1) a district court sitting in equity may 
order restitution unless there is a clear statutory limitation on 
the district court’s equitable jurisdiction and powers; and (2) 
restitution is permitted only where it furthers the purposes of 
the statute.” Id. at 225. We noted “[n]umerous courts have 
followed this approach in opining about a court’s power to 
order . . . disgorgement under several different statutes.” Id. In 
support, we cited, among other authorities, a decision holding 
disgorgement is available under Section 13(b). See id. (citing 
FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 470 (11th Cir. 1996)).  
 Following the analytical course that Lane Labs 
described, we conclude Section 13(b) does not implicitly 
empower district courts to order disgorgement. Unlike the 
statutes at issue in Porter, Mitchell, and Lane Labs, Section 
13(b) limits the district court’s equitable jurisdiction and 
powers because it specifies the form of equitable relief a court 
may order. Compare Porter, 328 U.S. at 397–98 (“a permanent 
or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order” in 
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court), Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 289 (“restrain violations”), and 
Lane Labs, 427 F.3d at 223 (same) with 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) 
(“enjoin”). Moreover, as we have explained, the context of 
Section 13(b) and the FTC Act’s broader statutory scheme both 
support “a necessary and inescapable inference” that a district 
court’s jurisdiction in equity under Section 13(b) is limited to 
ordering injunctive relief. Porter, 328 U.S. at 398. So our 
interpretation is consistent with Lane Labs and faithful to 
Porter and Mitchell. 
 The FTC counters that in Lane Labs, we cited Gem 
Merchandising, which held disgorgement is available under 
Section 13(b). But we cited that case solely to support our 
approach to applying Porter and Mitchell, and the other cases 
we cited involved three different statutes. Lane Labs, 427 F.3d 
at 225. We were not interpreting statutes en masse. 
 For these reasons, we hold district courts lack the power 
to order disgorgement under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act. So 
the District Court erred in requiring AbbVie and Besins to 
disgorge $448 million.  
B. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying injunctive relief. 
 To obtain an injunction, the FTC must show there is a 
“cognizable danger of recurrent violation, something more 
than the mere possibility which serves to keep the case alive.” 
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). An 
injunction that implicates a defendant’s First Amendment 
rights must “burden no more speech than necessary to serve a 
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significant government interest.” Madsen v. Women’s Health 
Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (citations omitted). 
 The FTC sought an injunction:  
(1) to prohibit the filing of any claims of patent 
infringement based on the ’894 patent by a 
product that does not include about 0.1% to 
about 5% isopropyl myristate; (2) to prohibit 
defendants from filing any other sham litigation; 
(3) to prohibit defendants from engaging in any 
action that misuses government processes for 
anticompetitive purposes; and (4) to require 
defendants to certify that any patent 
infringement litigation or other use of 
governmental processes has an objectively 
reasonable basis.  
AbbVie, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 144. It also sought an injunction to 
“restore competitive market conditions” by compelling 
AbbVie and Besins to license AndroGel 1.62% to one or more 
generic competitors, and to sell them a supply of the gel until 
they could manufacture it themselves. Id. at 145. At oral 
argument on appeal, the FTC stated that because the ’894 
patent would soon expire, on remand it would not seek to 
prohibit the filing of patent infringement claims based on the 
’894 patent, Oral Argument January 15, 2020 at 19:15–35; 
however, it reaffirmed its interest in a certification 
requirement, id. at 15:05–17:55.  
 The District Court found no basis on which to conclude 
AbbVie and Besins’s sham litigations were likely to recur. It 
explained the FTC proved only “that defendants filed two sham 
infringement lawsuits,” which do not establish a “pattern or 
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practice.” Id. And though the FTC advised the Court that since 
suing Teva and Perrigo in 2011, AbbVie and Besins have filed 
“numerous other patent infringement suits against competitors, 
including seven lawsuits related to the ’894 patent,” the FTC 
presented no evidence those lawsuits were shams. See id. at 
145 n.31. Moreover, the Court noted generic versions of 
AndroGel had been on the market for over three years. See id. 
at 145. Finally, the Court held that because the proposed 
injunction would have limited AbbVie and Besins’s ability to 
file patent infringement suits with respect to any patent, it was 
so “overbroad and punitive” that it would violate their First 
Amendment rights. See id. (citing Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765). 
 On appeal, the FTC argues the District Court abused its 
discretion because, under the likelihood-of-recurrence test that 
governs SEC cases, AbbVie and Besins are likely to engage in 
further sham litigation. FTC Br. 48–49 (citing SEC v. Bonastia, 
614 F.2d 908, 912 (3d Cir. 1980)). The FTC also argues the 
Court’s First Amendment concerns rested on a 
mischaracterization of the injunctive relief it requested. 
Although its “pretrial brief used broader language,” its 
proposed order did not seek to prohibit AbbVie and Besins 
from engaging in any action that misuses government 
processes. FTC Br. 52 n.13. In any event, the FTC argues its 
injunction is constitutional because the certification 
requirement and prohibition on sham litigation implicate no 
First Amendment rights. Id. at 54. It also cites the “well-
settled” rule that “once the Government has . . . establish[ed] a 
violation of law, all doubts as to the remedy are to be resolved 
in its favor.” Id. at 55 (citing United States v. E. I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 334 (1961)). 
 We disagree. Under Grant, the District Court had to 
determine whether the likelihood of AbbVie and Besins 
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engaging in sham litigation was a cognizable danger or merely 
possible. See 345 U.S. at 633. Even resolving doubts in the 
FTC’s favor, for the reasons the Court stated it was well within 
its discretion to conclude the FTC had shown a mere 
possibility. 
 Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion by failing 
to apply the Bonastia factors, which we have never applied in 
FTC Act cases. See 614 F.2d at 908. And we are disinclined to 
extend Bonastia here for two reasons. First, our review of the 
voluminous record on appeal did not uncover any indication 
the FTC argued the District Court should extend Bonastia 
outside the SEC context. To the contrary, the FTC’s proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law relied solely on Grant, 
which the District Court applied. To the extent the FTC did not 
timely raise this argument in the District Court, it is forfeited 
on appeal. See In Re: J & S Props., LLC, 872 F.3d 138, 146 
(3d Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 
341–42 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
 Second, we would not find an abuse of discretion even 
if Bonastia applied. Under that decision, courts look to:  
[1] the degree of scienter involved on the part of the 
defendant, [2] the isolated or recurrent nature of the 
infraction, [3] the defendant’s recognition of the 
wrongful nature of his conduct, [4] the sincerity of his 
assurances against future violations, and [5] the 
likelihood, because of defendant’s professional 




Bonastia, 614 F.2d at 912 (citation omitted). Although the 
Court did not recite these factors mechanically, its rationale 
accounted for the substance of all but the third and fourth. And 
the antitrust laws afford no relief on the basis of those factors 
alone. Cf. Howard Hess, 602 F.3d at 251 (citing Bonastia, 614 
F.2d at 912). 
 Thus, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying injunctive relief. 
C. Remand on the reverse-payment theory is not 
futile. 
 AbbVie and Besins argue that remand to allow the FTC 
to proceed on the reverse-payment theory would be futile for 
several reasons. None is persuasive. 
 First, AbbVie and Besins argue the FTC will not be able 
to show they “[are] violating, or [are] about to violate” the 
antitrust laws. AbbVie Br. 91 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)). But 
in Shire, we held that whereas Section 13(b) of the FTC Act 
requires a plaintiff to plead the defendant “is violating” or is 
“about to violate” the antitrust laws, the likelihood-of-
recurrence standard “applies when a court is considering 
whether to grant or deny injunctive relief.” 917 F.3d at 158. 
Second, AbbVie and Besins argue disgorgement would be 
inappropriate, both because Section 13(b) does not authorize it 
and because the District Court found, in calculating the amount 
of disgorgement, that Teva would not have marketed its 
generic gel even without the sham litigation. See AbbVie, 329 
F. Supp. 3d at 140 (“[T]he FTC has not established that, but for 
defendants’ sham litigation, Teva would have launched its 
product on June 2012 or at any time thereafter.”). We agree 
that disgorgement is inappropriate because Section 13(b) does 
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not authorize it. But because we cannot say, based on the 
pleadings alone, that the Court would abuse its discretion by 
granting the FTC injunctive relief, remand is not futile. 
Consistent with our holding in Shire, the District Court should 
apply the likelihood-of-recurrence standard. See 917 F.3d at 
158. Apart from that instruction, the District Court retains 
discretion to determine whether the FTC is entitled to an 
injunction if it ultimately succeeds on the reverse-payment 
theory. 
 Finally, at oral argument before our Court, counsel for 
AbbVie argued for the first time that the District Court’s 
finding that Teva would not have marketed its generic gel 
without the sham litigation means that, on remand, the FTC 
will be unable to show antitrust injury, which is an element of 
every antitrust claim. See generally Wellbutrin, 868 F.3d at 
164–65; Oral Arg. 29:10–36:25. Arguments not briefed are 
forfeited on appeal. See Griswold v. Coventry First LLC, 762 
F.3d 264, 274 n.8 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Regardless, 
we think that on remand, the Court must consider anew its 
finding that Teva would not have marketed its generic gel 
without the sham litigation. The FTC plausibly alleged AbbVie 
paid Teva a large, unjustified reverse payment to delay its entry 
into the market for AndroGel.  
* * * 
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order granting the motion to dismiss Count I in part 
and to dismiss Count II. We will also affirm the Court’s order 
adjudging AbbVie and Besins liable for monopolization under 
Count I based upon its holding that the suit against Perrigo was 
a sham. Finally, we will affirm the Court’s order denying 
99 
 
injunctive relief, reverse the Court’s disgorgement order, and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
